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INTRODUCTION
Congress created the federal court system in 1789' and has
overhauled its structure only once since then, in 1891,2 though the
courts' role and jurisdiction have changed markedly over the years. The
1891 restructuring followed decades of lamenting a "crisis" in the federal
courts,3 particularly in terms of their appellate capacity. The caseload
crisis' so widely debated today strikes a similar chord. The dimensions
of a "crisis of volume"5 in the federal courts have been the subject of
several studies over the past thirty years.6 While indicia of the courts of
appeals' continuing success exist,7 the weight of opinion holds that a
1. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 [hereinafter Evarts Act].
3. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUsINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY SYSTEM 4-102 (1928).
4. For an early study of the workload of the federal courts of appeals, see PAUL
D. CARRINGTON, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968).
5. DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS
OF VOLUME (1974).
6. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter FCSC
REPORT]; COMMISSION ON REVISION OF FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67
F.R.D. 195 [hereinafter HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT]; STUDY GROUP OF FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., REPORT ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57
F.R.D. 573 [hereinafter FREUND REPORT]; WILL SHAFROTH, SURVEY OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1967), reprinted in 42 F.R.D. 243 [hereinafter SHAFROTH
REPORT].
7. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
"Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for
Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOwA L. REv. 871, 890 (1983) (arguing that rising number of
cases in federal system does not necessarily indicate courts are unable to perform their
traditional function, and calling for more pertinent studies to determine if such a link
exists); Michael C. Gizzi, Examining the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
77 JUDICATURE 96, 99 (1993) (noting reduction in median disposition time and increase
in terminations per judge since 1980); Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, Federal
Courts at the Crossroads: Adapt or Lose!, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 211, 227 (1994)
(reporting increase in appellate case disposition rate over the past 30 years from 64.2 to
284.2 per judge annually); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit
Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 925
(1983) (arguing that statistics establishing that the courts of appeals are issuing more
opinions than 20 years ago or that intercircuit conflicts have risen may indicate that the
system is working and citizens are more aware of their legal rights, not that the structure
has failed).
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crisis is brewing, if not fully developed.8 Measures adopted to cope with
rising caseloads have exacerbated the "crisis" by sharply altering time-
honored traditions of appellate justice.9
8. The Federal Courts Study Committee subscribed to this view, as do many
federal judges. See, e.g., FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 6; Levin H. Campbell, Into
the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System for the Federal Courts Study Committee,
74 MASS. L. REV. 292 (1989); Henry J. Friendly, The 'Law of the Circuit"and All That,
46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406 (1972); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence,
Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1983); Shirley
M. Hufstedler, Bad Recipes for Good Cooks-Indigestible Reforms of the Judiciary, 27
ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1985); Donald P. Lay, The Federal Appeals Process: Whither We
Goest? The Next Fifiy Years, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515 (1989) [hereinafter Lay,
The Federal Appeals Process]; Donald P. Lay, Will the Proposed National Court of
Appeals Create More Problems than it Solves?, 66 JUDICATURE 437 (1983) [hereinafter
Lay, National Court of Appeals]; Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review
in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151 (1981) [hereinafter Lay, A Proposal]; J.
Edward Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 29 (1968); Carl McGowan, The View from an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 659 (1982); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts Reform Should Start at the Top, 77
JUDICATURE 104 (1993); Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals
to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1989); Parker &
Hagin, supra note 7; S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal
Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a
Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial
Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983); Thomas M. Reavley, A Review of Rationing
Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 26 TEx. TECH L. REV.
271 (1995); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal
Courts, The Kastenmeier Lecture (Sept. 15, 1992), in 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1; Stephen
Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary is it Anyway?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (1993); Alvin
B. Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648 (1980); Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the Federal
Judiciary, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 751 (1992); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the
Overloaded Circuits-A Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 455
(1995); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43
EMORY L.J. 1147 (1994); John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L.
REV. 787 (1980). But see FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 123 (statement of Judge
Cabranes). The Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") explicitly declined to use the word
"crisis" in discussing these issues. FJC, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1993) [hereinafter FJC,
ALTERNATIVESI.
9. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE
L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983) (stating that bureaucratization "corrode[s] the individualistic
processes that are the source of judicial legitimacy"); Wade H. McCre, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 777, 778 (describing "significant costs to quality of justice" associated with reforms
intended to increasejudicial efficiency); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial
Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 4 (noting that procedural innovations
and case management techniques "undermine judicial accountability").
HeinOnline  -- 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 13 1996
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
In a previous article," I examined the courts of appeals' retreat from
the tradition of writing and publishing full opinions in the majority of
cases. Viewing this development from the perspective of the courts of
appeals' de facto role as the primary enunciators of national law,"1 I
concluded that it had dire implications for the development of a coherent
body of law and would ultimately exacerbate the litigation explosion in
the federal courts.1 I noted that the courts of appeals should pursue
other types of reforms to accommodate rising caseloads while remaining
faithful to core values of our legal system. Still focusing primarily on the
need to develop and maintain a coherent body of federal law while
preserving elements of the appellate process that promote just resolutions
in individual cases, I now turn to an analysis of possible structural
reforms in the federal courts.
My analysis focuses on the courts of appeals, not because it is only
there that a crisis exists, but because that crisis is acute. 13 The rate of
appeal to the courts of appeals has risen much faster than district court
filings.14 At the same time, fewer and fewer cases decided by the courts
of appeals are heard by the Supreme Court.15 Thus, the courts of
appeals are squeezed from both ends:16 from below, by litigants
increasingly seeking review of district court decisions; from above, by a
Supreme Court able to rule on only the tiniest fraction of cases presented
to it.17 Moreover, the courts of appeals currently perform both aspects
10. Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish?
Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a
Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995) (examining increased incidence of
unpublished opinions, summary dispositions, and vacatur upon settlement).
11. For a discussion of law-making responsibility in the federal courts, and the
roles of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, see id. at 766-68 and sources cited
therein.
12. Id. at 800-01.
13. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 14
(1985) (noting difficulty of expanding intermediate tier of judicial pyramid); Wilkinson,
supra note 8, at 1173 (describing courts of appeals as "especially vulnerable to the
problem of expansion").
14. Arthur D. Hellman, The Crisis in the Circuits and the Innovations of the
Browning Years, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AND THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL COURTS 3, 5-6 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); see also
infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 152; cf Miner, supra note 8, at 106 (stating that increase in
the number of cases heard and changes in the process at the Supreme Court level would
alleviate the caseload burden of the lower federal courts).
16. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 8; see infra notes 72-91, 151-55 and accompanying
text; see also Dragich, supra note 10, at 768.
17. See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 1 (1986).
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of the appellate function: error correction and law making.' 8 The
converging caseload pressures and dual responsibilities highlight both the
importance of the courts of appeals and the weak spot in the current
structure where a breakdown is most likely to occur.
Every commentator who perceives a crisis offers a different
solution.' 9 But underlying all proposed solutions are two basic
18. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976)
(describing "review for correctness" and "institutional review"); Wilkinson, supra note
8, at 1173 (noting that functions of appellate courts include resolution of cases and
exposition of legal precedent). Carrington et al. acknowledge that it is difficult to draw
the line between the two functions. CARRINGTON LiT AL., supra, at 4. Obviously, many
courts make (or clarify) law in the course of resolving specific disputes. But the two
appellate functions have entirely different objectives. Review for error focuses on
ensuring a just result for the parties, while institutional review focuses on systemic
concerns such as promoting uniformity in law and confidence in the legal system. Id. at
2-3. This Article examines whether these distinct appellate functions are best assigned to
one court, as they are now (for all practical purposes) to the courts of appeals, or to
separate courts. In the latter case, the court assigned the law-making function would
operate to correct errors in the cases before it, albeit as an incidental, rather than a
primary, role.
19. THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 238 (1994). Federal judges have proposed or endorsed a
multitude of solutions. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 8, at 296-97 (advocating, among
other proposals, a feasibility study for allowing the Supreme Court to refer intercircuit
conflicts down to a neutral circuit for final judgment en banc); Edwards, supra note 7, at
901-02, 924-35 (advocating imposition of monetary sanctions on litigants whose claims
are determined frivolous, and more attractive, effective methods of alternative dispute
resolution to reduce the demand for the federal courts); Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 20
(suggestingthat federal judges must adopt "appropriate restraint and detachment," become
effective "complex case administrators," and, above all, avoid overdependence on staff);
Lay, The Federal Appeals Process, supra note 8, at 525-27 (advocating dividing large
circuits into regional divisions while strictly limiting the use of en banc proceedings and
limiting the right to appeal); Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1151 (arguing for
discretionary review in civil cases lacking substance or merit); Lumbard, supra note 8,
at 44 (advocating circuit division or realignment rather than increasing any appeals court
beyond nine judges); McGowan, supra note 8, at 664-71 (calling for elimination .of
diversity jurisdiction, adopting discretionary appeals or creating an experimental national
court of appeals); Miner, supra note 8, at 106 (arguing that changes at the Supreme Court
level are necessary to relieve the caseload burden on lower federal courts); Newman,
supra note 8, at 768 (calling for reallocation of jurisdiction from federal to state courts
and discretionary access to federal court in some categories of cases); Plager, supra note
8, at 863-66 (advocating that all circuit courts be modeled after the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and distinguishing it from a specialty court); Posner, supra note
8, at 765 (suggesting that the best long-term methods of handling the caseload crisis are
to create monetary disincentives to bringing unmeritorious cases and by reducing the scope
of federal law); Reavley, supra note 8, at 273 (stating federal court jurisdiction should
consist only of federal law questions and consolidated trials of mass tort cases); Sporkin,
supra note 8, at 754 (advocating, among many proposals, establishment of specialized
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strategies: either reduce the flow of cases, or find a way to accommodate
the rising tide.' Broadly speaking, reforms aimed at reducing the flow
of cases rely on Congress to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts
by statute," or on the Supreme Court to restrict jurisdiction through
courts); William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1986) (advocating permanent implementation of Warren Burger's
proposed national court of appeals that would act, not as a fourth tier, but as a "lower
chamber" of the Supreme Court); Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 1 (advocating additional
judgeships in order to maintain a purpose of service to the public welfare); J. Clifford
Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 288 (1994)
(arguing that large circuits, like the Ninth, increase precedential stability and efficiency
by providing a large body of case law for lawyers and litigants to draw upon); Weis,
supra note 8, at 455 (advocating unitary appellate court); Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1186
(advocating the need for a change in attitude toward growth in the federal judiciary,
including a realization of the problems of growth, especially the increase of federal
judgeships); see also FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 109-36.
20. See, e.g., HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 205-06; Parker &
Hagin, supra note 7, at 214 (quoting the late Judge Rubin's suggestion that the two basic
ways to deal with caseload pressures are to decrease the number of cases filed in the
district courts or to implement a discretionary system of review). Parker and Hagin
believe both approaches are required.
21. Congress has shown no inclination to pursue this approach. In fact, over the
history of the federal courts, jurisdiction has steadily expanded. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 3, at 56-102 (describing steady expansion of federal jurisdiction and
unsuccessful attempts to constrict jurisdiction); Carolyn Dineen King, Commentary, A
Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955, 956 (1991) (noting that Congress attempts
to cure national ills by enacting federal legislation "creating rights and entitlements" for
the federal courts to enforce); Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 215 (noting Congress'
'penchant for ever-expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts"); see also Edwards,
supra note 7, at 922-24; Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 15-17; Lay, The Federal Appeals
Process, supra note 8, 525-27; McGowan, supra note 8, at 664-65; Newman, supra note
8, at 768-71; Reavely, supra note 8, at 273; Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 5; Rubin, supra
note 8, at 656-59; Wisdom, supra note 8, at 789. Political difficulties inhere in any
attempt to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 195; Richard A. Posner, Introduction of the Federal Courts Symposium,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (discussing politics of judicial reform generally). Carrington,
Meador, and Rosenberg consider jurisdictional reform efforts "doomed." CARuRINGTON
ET AL., supra note 18, at 195. Moreover, the potential for jurisdictional reforms to
resolve the caseload problem of the courts of appeals is unknown, since such reforms
would operate to reduce filings in the district courts. Fewer filings in the districts courts
could be expected to reduce the appellate caseload, but since the rate of appeals has been
rising much faster than the rate of filings, this would represent a partial solution at best.
See FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 14-15; Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal
Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 53. For an
overview of jurisdictional proposals, see FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 141-53.
For specific jurisdictional proposals, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COMM. ON
LONG RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 20-
32 (1994).
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abstention, the justiciability doctrines, and similar devices.' These
reforms fall outside the scope of my analysis. I take rising caseloads as
a given, and focus on reforms designed to accommodate them.
Such reforms can be classified as internal' or systemic' changes.
The courts of appeals have adopted numerous internal, procedural reforms
on a circuit-by-circuit basis. These reforms include reduction in oral
argument, increasing reliance on central and chambers staff, and
decreasing publication of opinions.' In my view, the potential for
internal reforms has been completely exhausted,' and some of the
reforms already adopted are, in fact, detrimental. Thus, systemic,
particularly structural, reforms hold the greatest promise of resolving the
22. f. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 24-52 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing Congress' prerogative
to restrict jurisdiction of federal courts); George D. Brown, Nonideological Judicial
Reform and Its Limits-The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 973 (1990); Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional
Restraint, and the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 361
(noting that judiciary treads on legislature's prerogative when it imports caseload analysis
into jurisdictional theories); Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 236-44 (discussing federal
courts' inherent powers to implement jurisdictional restraint if Congress fails to do so);
Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 603-04 (1985) (discussing
preclusion doctrines). Furthermore, jurisdictional reforms may drive out important cases
too early-before they have had any hearing. Brown, supra, at 988; Levit, supra, at 321-
22. It might be better to let them in but impose mechanisms to ensure that only
meritorious cases advance. But see Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts
of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 542, 554 (1969). According to Carrington, "relaxation" of the doctrines of ripeness
and mootness, and of the final judgment rule, has contributed to the increase in appellate
litigation.
23. BAKER, supra note 19, at 106 (describing what he terms "intramural"
reforms).
24. Id. at 186 (describing "extramural" reforms).
25. Baker provides an overview in Chapter Six ("Intramural Reforms Already
Implemented: What the Courts of Appeals Have Done to Help Themselves") of his book,
Rationing Justice on Appeal. Id. at 106-50. For examples of additional internal reform
proposals by federal judges, see Donald P. Lay, Reconciling Tradition With Reality: The
Expedited Appeal, 23 UCLA L. REV. 419 (1976) (advocating reducing the time from
notice of appeal to final disposition from an average of 7.8-10 months to 75 days for most
civil and criminal cases within the federal system); Rubin, supra note 8, at 655-56 (calling
for better non-judge staff management).
26. Baker suggests that additional intramural reforms may prove productive, but
admits that "these [reforms] appear to be ... variations on a theme," and concedes that
intramural reforms have been "all but exhausted." BAKER, supra note 19, at 152; see
also FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 109 (pointing particularly to internal reforms aimed
at increased productivity); Edwards, supra note 7, at 916 (concluding that internal
reforms, such as increasing administrative capabilities and judicial productivity, have
reached their limit).
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appellate crisis. Of course, systemic reforms are outside the courts'
power to impose, leaving them at the mercy of a Congress that so far
remains unpersuaded of the need for decisive action.
In this Article, I describe a structure capable of accommodating
growing caseloads in a manner consistent with basic values of appellate
justice. Before doing so, I sketch in Part I the structural evolution of the
federal courts. Part II describes the current pressures on the courts of
appeals, while Part III examines the effects of internal reforms on the
quality of appellate justice and the development of a coherent body of
national law. Next, in Part IV, I posit requirements for the federal
courts' third century. Part V reviews major proposals to address the
caseload crisis in the courts of appeals. These proposals include
increasing the number of judges, adding a fourth tier to the federal court
system, adopting a certiorari-like system for initial appeals, and adjusting
the present circuit structure. I argue that these reforms, especially
considered in the alternative, either will not meaningfully address the
caseload crisis for any length of time or will, in the process, compromise
dearly-held notions of appellate justice. Finally, in Part VI, I propose a
structure that interweaves aspects of several earlier proposals. Briefly,
this structure establishes District Court Appellate Panels and a unitary
Court of Appeals with largely discretionary jurisdiction, but leaves the
role and responsibilities of the Supreme Court unchanged. I argue that
this structure can accommodate rising caseloads without further diluting
appellate justice or threatening coherence in federal law. Moreover, the
proposed structure is consistent with the pattern of change in the federal
courts over the past two hundred years.
I. STRUCTURAL EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS"
The Constitution requires that there be "one supreme court," and
allows for such lower federal courts as Congress "may from time to time
ordain and establish."' The Judiciary Act of 1789' established the
27. This section provides only the barest outline of the structural evolution of the
federal courts. For thorough histories, see PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-39 (3d ed. 1988);
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 4-102; John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 3 (1948); Daniel J. Meltzer, The
History and Structure ofArticle III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Erwin C. Surrency,
A History of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1963); Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
28. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1.
29. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
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original federal court system, and only once since then, in 1891,' has
a major revision of the original design been implemented. 1 The Act of
1789 established a two-tiered system of courts consisting of trial courts
and the Supreme Court. 2 Initially, the federal courts' primary caseload
was diversity and admiralty cases.33 The federal courts did not exercise
general federal question jurisdiction until 1875.' Appeal to the Supreme
Court by writ of error was provided from final determinations of the
lower federal courts,3" but there was no right to appeal from criminal
convictions until 1889.6
Light caseloads in the pre-Civil War period permitted the Supreme
Court to supervise the lower federal courts effectively. In addition, the
30. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (popularly known
as the Evarts Act).
31. Actually, Congress enacted major revisions to the original design in 1801.
Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. These reforms, however, were soon repealed by
the Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note
3, at 24-28 (describing enactment and repeal of 1801 reforms). Thus, only the 1891
reforms significantly affected the structure of the federal court system.
32. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (describing the Supreme
Court); id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 73 (establishing the district courts); id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74
(establishing the circuit courts). The district courts were trial courts; the circuit courts
were primarily trial courts but also exercised limited appellate jurisdiction. See Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-78; Paul D. Carrington, The Function of
the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411, 412 (1987). Although the
1789 Act established three courts, many scholars describe it as a two-tiered system. See
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 13 (characterizing the district and circuit courts
as "two nisi prius courts dealing with different items of litigation" and noting "not a trace
. . . of a suggestion for an [intermediate] appellate tribunal"); Thomas E. Baker,
Precedent Tunes Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 S.W. L.J. 687, 689
(1981) (describing the original circuit courts as "the principal federal trial court" and the
Supreme Court as "the principal appellate court"). Others characterize the original
structure as having three tiers though staffed by two ranks of judges. See, e.g.,
Carrington, supra, at 412.
33. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 7-10; Carrington, supra note
32, at 413.
34. General federal question jurisdiction was conferred by the Act of Mar. 3,
1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. Previously, cases asserting rights arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States were heard in the state courts, subject
to Supreme Court review from the highest state court. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
supra note 3, at 65 (describing changes wrought by the Act of 1875 as "revolutionary,"
at least in retrospect). But see David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under
the 1789 Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 521, 521-22 (1989) (stating that
"federal question jurisdiction was fully vested by the Judiciary Act of 1789").
35. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84.
36. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 412. The Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, §
6, 25 Stat. 655, 656, established a right of appeal in capital cases only. The right was
extended to all criminal cases by the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
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provision that two Supreme Court justices would sit on each circuit
cour 7 brought a national perspective to bear at the intermediate
appellate level. But as the country grew and the jurisdiction of the federal
courts expanded, caseloads rose. An appellate caseload crisis developed
in the post-Civil War period." This crisis was attributable, in part, to
the Supreme Court's responsibility for both error correction and law
making." That is, the practical difficulties of riding circuit led to
untenable conditions for the correction of error, such as appeal to a single
district judge.' On the other hand, circuit-riding duties combined with
the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction caused severe backlogs in the
Supreme Court, preventing it from addressing questions of national law
in a timely fashion.'
The Evarts Act of 189142 instituted a radically different structure
for the federal courts. It expanded the federal court system from two to
three tiers.' The district courts retained their trial jurisdiction." The
Act assigned the two appellate functions to two separate courts.45 The
37. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74. The Justices' circuit-riding
duties were reduced in 1869, at the same time that the first circuit judges were authorized.
Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44; see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3,
at 69-70 (describing these reforms as ineffectual).
38. See, e.g., ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 11; Carrington, supra
note 32, at 413.
39. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 69-70 (noting that Supreme Court
docket was "a record of arrears"); Daniel J. Meador, The Federal Judiciary-Inflation,
Malfunction and a Proposed Course ofAction, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 617,622 (describing
pressure on Supreme Court and characterizing "insufficient appellate capacity" as the
"most serious problem affecting the system"),
40. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 69 (describing as "evil" the
"unrestrained power" of district judges sitting alone on appeal).
41. See id. at 60, 69; Carrington, supra note 32, at 413 (citing contemporary
opinion that Supreme Court arrearage "amounts almost to a denial of justice" and that
circuit riding substantially limited the Supreme Court's caseload capacity).
42. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
43. The Act provided for the establishment of circuit courts of appeal with
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the district and circuit courts, with the possibility
of further review by the Supreme Court. Evarts Act, ch. 517, §§ 2, 6, 26 Stat. 826, 826,
828. As a political compromise, the 1891 Act retained the old circuit courts, but
eliminated their limited appellate powers. Id. § 4, 26 Stat. at 827; see FRANKFURTER &
LANDIS, supra note 3, at 99-101 (describing passage of Evarts Act); id. at 128-35
(recounting efforts to remedy this feature of the 1891 Act).
44. The Evarts Act made no changes to the composition or jurisdiction of the
district courts. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
45. The Act gave the circuit courts of appeals jurisdiction to review, by appeal
or writ of error, cases other than those for which the Act explicitly preserved direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891). Direct
appeal to the Supreme Court was available in cases where the jurisdiction of the courts
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courts of appeals fulfilled the error-correction role, taking appeals as of
right from the district and circuit courts.' The Supreme Court remained
responsible for interpretation of the Federal Constitution, enunciation of
national law, and supervision of the lower federal courts, but "self-
consciously ceased playing [the] role" of a court of error.47
The Evarts Act organized the courts of appeals regionally into
circuits of three judges each.' Only two of the three judges were
permanently assigned to the circuit court of appeals.' The third judge
was either the circuit justice or a district judge.' The Act of 1911"
merged the circuit courts into the district courts.52
The Evarts Act began, and the Judiciary Act of 1925 5 continued,
the trend toward discretionary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.'
Recent developments have eliminated almost all remaining vestiges of
mandatory jurisdiction in the Supreme Court.55 Thus, appeal as of right
presently lies only to the courts of appeals.'
was in issue, in capital cases, and in cases involving the construction or application of the
Constitution, challenging the constitutionality or construction of a federal statute, or
alleging that a state statute violated the United States Constitution. Id. § 5, 26 Stat. 826,
827. Moreover, the circuit courts of appeals were allowed to certify to the Supreme
Court "any questions or propositions of law." Id. § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828. Thus, direct
appeal to the Supreme Court remained available for most questions of law, leaving the
new circuit courts of appeals to fulfill the error-correction role.
46. CARRINOTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 200. Likewise, Estreicher and Sexton
argue that the correction of errors plays virtually no part in the Supreme Court's role
today. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 4-5.
47. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 1; see also id. at 129-30.
48. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (1891).
49. Id. § 1, 26 Stat. at 826 (authorizing one additional circuit judge per circuit).
50. Id. § 3, 26 Stat. at 827.
51. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 1, 36 Stat. 1087.
52. Id. §§ 289-291, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167; see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 3, at 128-35 (describing confusion inherent in Evarts Act's retention of two sets of
courts, district and circuit, of largely concurrent jurisdiction).
53. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (often called the "Judges Bill").
54. The Evarts Act allowed a second appeal as of right in civil cases where the
amount in controversy was over $1,000, except in diversity and certain other cases.
Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891). The 1925 Act enlarged the certiorari
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and reduced mandatory appeals. Act of Feb. 13, 1925,
ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936, 936 (amending § 240 of the Judicial Code of 1911 to allow
certiorari upon petition of either party and amending § 238 of the Judicial Code of 1911
to restrict direct review by the Supreme Court of district court judgments).
55. Supreme Court Case Selection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 2, 102 Stat. 662,
662 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994)). The 1988 Act repealed 28 U.S.C. §
1252, which had permitted appeal to the Supreme Court from any case declaring a federal
statute unconstitutional, or where a federal agency was a party.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) provides for Supreme Court review from the courts
of appeals by writ of certiorari upon petition of either party or by certification by the
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Precisely the same problem that faced the Supreme Court a century
ago has recurred, this time in the courts of appeals.5 7 Facing
unprecedented demand for the correction of error below, but also having
assumed de facto a large share of the law-making burden for the federal
courts, the courts of appeals are unable to perform either function well.
Caseload pressures have grown to the point where the courts of appeals
cannot devote sufficient time or attention to reviewing individual cases for
error. In terms of law declaration, the courts of appeals lack not only
time but also the national focus that is essential to the coherent
development of federal law.5" In 1891, when the current structure was
designed, "the perceived role of an effective appellate system was to
correct the error of the trial court in applying the law to the facts. No
one thought appellate courts necessary or useful in making law or
policy.""' The courts of appeals' sole focus on error correction made
sense in a time when the body of federal law was small and the Supreme
Court was easily capable of overseeing its development.' By the early
1970s, however, the federal courts of appeals were "charged with
declaring and defining the national law, subject only to Supreme Court
court of appeals of a question of law. Both routes are discretionary. See, e.g., Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 436 (1963) (stating that review by certiorari "is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor"); Rutherford v. AMA, 379 F.2d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 1967)
("certification of questions [to the Supreme Court]... rests in the discretion of [the court
of appeals] and cannot be invoked by a party as a matter of right"). Moreover, while 28
U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1994) seems to require the Court to accept cases on certification,
"there are so many grounds on which the Court may find the certificate improper that its
jurisdiction over certificates is in fact discretionary." CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 106, at 777 (5th ed. 1994).
57. See Meador, supra note 39, at 644.
58. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1165-66 (describing federal courts'
increasing orientation toward local controversy, rather than significant national interests);
id. at 1177-78 (noting that increase in number of circuits will "move federal law in a
more parochial direction" at the expense of the "interstate character of [federal] appellate
review).
59. Carrington, supra note 32, at 416; see also CARRINOTON Er AL., supra note
18, at 200. The design of the courts of appeals as error-correction courts also reflects the
view that judges "discovered" and applied the law, but did not make it. See, e.g., id. at
3 (noting that "[ulntil recent decades. . . we were given to proclaiming that judges do
not make law" but that "[tioday, such a comment is seldom heard"); POSNER, supra note
13, at 1 (stating that "the fact remains that judges make, and do not just find and apply,
law"); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95
YALE L.J. 62, 69 (1985) (stating that "lilt is by now a commonplace that courts do and
should engage in judicial lawmaking, in interpreting, shaping, and articulating the law,
when statutory and constitutional pronouncements fall short or land wide").
60. CARRINOTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 200 (noting that Supreme Court was
sufficient to handle any need for judicial law making),
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review. " " As the specific role of the courts of appeals within the
federal court system has changed over time, these courts have evolved
into institutions quite different from those created by the Evarts Act.62
The courts of appeals' actual responsibilities are out of sync with the
structure established by the century-old Act.'
The evolution of the federal courts reflects steadily expanding
jurisdiction along with a reduction in the attention paid to each case."
Although well aware of the caseload pressures confronting the lower
federal courts, Congress has not limited their jurisdiction.' In fact, the
trend is to open federal courts to cases heretofore heard exclusively in the
state courts, and to create previously unknown causes of action.'
Opposite trends, such as restriction of diversity jurisdiction, pale in
comparison in terms of their impact on caseloads. Resistance to curtailing
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not new.6' But while jurisdiction
61. HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 206.
62. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 428 (noting that "contemporary circuit
judges are under pressures of time that are inconsistent with the role envisioned for them
by the draftsmen of the Evarts Act").
63. See Weis, supra note 8, at 464 (describing "the jerry-built system of the
courts of appeals that has grown up over the last 100 years [as] obviously out of date").
64. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 187 (noting "vast
expansion of the bounds of the inferior federal courts" and corresponding narrowing of
the scope of review by the Supreme Court). Arguments about whether this evolution
reflects the proper role of the federal courts are outside the scope of this Article.
65. Congress has tinkered with jurisdiction in fairly modest ways, such as
increasing the amount in controversy requirement from $10,000 to $50,000 in 1988.
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201,
102 Stat. 4642, 4646. The proposed Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1995 would
raise the amount to $75,000 and tie it to increases in the Consumer Price Index. See S.
1101, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 309 (1995); H.R. 1989, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 309
(1995) (containing identical provisions to S. 1101). 1 characterize these adjustments as
"modest" because litigants can easily get around them and because they would eliminate
relatively few cases. See, e.g., Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and
Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REv. 961, 976 (1995) (noting that even raising amount in
controversy to $100,000 would eliminate only eight percent of diversity cases).
66. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941 (creating a federal cause of action for
recovery of damages for victims of violent crimes motivated by gender). See generally
Richard S. Arnold, The Future of the Federal Courts, 60 Mo. L. REv. 533, 540-41
(1995); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 22-26 (1973)
(listing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, and numerous other examples of this trend); Sarah S. Beale, Too
Many and Yet Too Few: New Princiles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction, 46 HAsTINOs L.J. 979,979-80 (1995) (describing steady expansion of federal
government's criminal authority and noting that there are now over 3000 federal crimes).
67. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 136-44 (describing
unsuccessful attempts to curtail jurisdiction between 1891 and 1911). Congress has been
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has grown, the appellate process has changed dramatically. Few litigants
have the opportunity to be heard in the Supreme Court anymore, an
option once open in all cases where jurisdictional requirements were
met." The Supreme Court itself has stated that review by writ of
certiorari "does not provide a normal appellate channel in any sense
comparable to the writ of error."6
In the courts of appeals, the appellate process has also changed
dramatically. Cases are screened by staff attorneys instead of judges, oral
arguments are becoming a rarity, and the courts frequently do not explain
their decisions in published opinions.' ° At the district court level, the
use of magistrate judges to hear certain cases, the implementation of
alternative dispute resolution programs, and the active participation of
judges in settling cases also fit this pattern. 1 In short, the federal courts
have opened their doors ever wider, but have steadily reduced the process
afforded to litigants once they enter.
much more prone to create new courts and authorize additional judges. Id. at 220.
Moreover, Congress has specifically exempted jurisdictional reform from studies it has
commissioned, such as the Hruska Commission. Maurice Rosenberg, Enlarging the
Federal Courts' Capacity to Settle the National Law, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 709, 711 (1975).
68. The 1789 Act provided for Supreme Court review, by writ of error, of any
case in which the matter in dispute exceeded $2000. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22,
1 Stat. 72, 84; see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 258 (noting deep opposition
to 1891 Act's elimination of litigants' right to resort to Supreme Court for vindication of
federal claims).
69. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 436 (1963).
70. Robel, supra note 9, at 40-56.
71. 1 do not mean to suggest that these developments are necessarily bad; in fact,
they are widely regarded as beneficial to litigants and essential to the district courts'
ability to manage their caseloads. In addition, many of these programs in the district
courts operate to reduce the number of appeals taken to the courts of appeals. The point
is that Congress and the federal courts have made, and society has accepted, substantial
departures from the original model for delivery of justice.
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II. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Statistics show that the lower federal courts have changed drastically
since 1960.' District court filings increased 216% from 1960 to
1994.' In the courts of appeals, filings soared 1139% over the same
period.74 Terminations on the merits have fallen in both the district
courts75 and the courts of appeals.76 Of cases terminated on the merits,
72. The year 1960 is used as a line of demarcation because it seems to signify a
turning point for the federal courts. According to the Federal Courts Study Committee,
"[flor decades before this transition year caseload growth had been moderate in the district
courts ... and virtually nil in the courts of appeals; since then it has been consistently
great in both." 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS AND
SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 31 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC, WORKINo PAPERS].
73. District court filings grew from 89,112 in 1960 to 281,864 in 1994.
DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 1960 ANN. REP. thl. C1, at 224, tbl. D1,
at 288 [hereinafter 1960 ANNUAL REPORT]; DIRECTOR OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
ANNUAL REPORT]. The sharpest increase occurred between 1980 and 1990; the rate of
growth leveled off somewhat after 1990. Caseload expansion outstrips population growth.
District court filings grew from 32.8 civil cases and 15.6 criminal cases per 100,000
population in 1960 to 86.6 civil cases and 19.1 criminal cases per 100,000 population in
1990. Charles W. Nihan & Harvey Rishikof, Rethinking the Federal Court System:
Thinking the Unthinkable, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 349, 360, 362 (1994).
74. In 1960, 3899 cases were commenced in the courts of appeals. 1960 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. Bi, at 210. By 1994, filings had grown to 48,322. 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 2. Courts of appeals statistics for 1994 exclude the
Federal Circuit because the Annual Report does not collect them. The sharpest increase
occurred between 1990 and 1994. Caseload trends in the courts of appeals necessarily lag
behind those in the district courts, so it may be that the slower rate of increase
experienced in the district courts since 1990 has yet to be felt in the courts of appeals.
Of course, not all appeals come from the district courts.
75. In 1960, 11.2% of district court cases were tried; by 1994 this figure had
fallen to 6.3%. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. C7, at 274
(reporting 9998 trials in 1960) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. C-7, at
AI-90 (reporting 17,771 civil and criminal trials). Due to increased pressures of criminal
caseloads, district courts now try more criminal and fewer civil cases. Beale, supra note
66, at 988.
76. The courts of appeals terminated 72.2% of cases in 1960 on the merits,
compared with 55.3% in 1994. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. B1,
at 210 (reporting 3713 cases terminated) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl.
B-5, at AI-26 (reporting 49,184 cases terminated).
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the courts of appeals' reversal rate has steadily declined." Nevertheless,
the rate of appeal continues to rise.'
The federal judiciary, of course, has also grown during the period of
remarkable caseload expansion. 9 In 1960, there were 248 authorized
district court judgeships;' in 1994, there were 649.'1 In the courts of
appeals, 68 judgeships were authorized in 1960,2 compared with 167 in
1993.1 Even so, filings per judgeship have continued to rise in both the
district courts" and the courts of appeals.'
Caseload trends are susceptible of a variety of interpretations. For
purposes of this Article, two implications are important. First, a shift in
the caseload mix in the courts of appeals indicates increasing demand for
the resolution of federal questions and for supervision of the criminal
77. In 1960, the courts of appeals affirmed or enforced 78.1% (1924 of 2681) and
reversed 24.5% of cases terminated on the merits. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
73, tbl. BI, at 210. Other merits terminations, such as remands and dismissals, accounted
for the remaining 3.7%. Id. In 1994 the courts of appeals affirmed or enforced 80.4%
and reversed only 10.4% of cases terminated on the merits. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 73, tbl. B-5, at AI-26. Other merits terminations account for the remaining
9.2%. Id.
78. In 1960, one in 30 district court terminations was appealed. 1960 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. Cl, at 224 (reporting 61,829 civil terminations), tbl. Dl, at
288 (reporting 29,864 criminal terminations). Today the figure is one in five. 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. B-7, at AI-38 (reporting 42,983 appeals from
district courts), tbl. C, at AI-48 (reporting 228,361 district court terminations). The
Federal Judicial Center recently reported that although district court terminations doubled
and appeals tripled between 1977 and 1993, FJC, STALKING THE INCREASE IN THE RATE
OF FEDERAL CIVIL APPEALS 7 (1995), the rising rate of appeal was largely accounted for
by growth of appeals in prisoner and civil rights cases, cases that "raise fundamental
questions of personal liberty" and face "decreased financial barriers to court access." Id.
at 16-17.
79. See infra part V.A. for a discussion of proposals for further expansion of the
federal judiciary.
80. FCSC, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 29.
81. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. 3, at 7. The current provision for
district judgeships appears at 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (1994), and that for circuit judgeships
is at 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1994).
82. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 68.
83. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. 1, at 3. This figure excludes
Federal Circuit judgeships, currently totalling 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1994).
84. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 86 (reporting 221 civil and
107 criminal filings per district judgeship) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl.
X-IA, at AI-301 (reporting 342 civil and 74 criminal filings (unweighted) per district
judgeship).
85. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 68 (reporting 3899 filings
and 68 judgeships, or 57.3 filings per judgeship) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
73, tbl. 1, at 3 (reporting 48,322 filings and 167 judgeships, or 289.3 filings per
judgeship).
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justice system. Among civil cases, private federal question appeals have
increased dramatically.' Diversity appeals, on the other hand, have
declined.' Meanwhile, criminal appeals and prisoner filings have risen
in the courts of appeals,"' outstripping district court filings." Criminal
cases, prisoner petitions, and private federal question cases are unlikely
to be eliminated by any jurisdictional reforms that Congress might
eventually adopt.' Moreover, since diversity appeals are already
86. In the courts of appeals these cases made up 13.7% of the docket in 1960,
compared with 43.1% in 1994. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. B5,
at 223 (reporting 532 private federal question cases) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 73, tbl. B-IA, at AI-8 (reporting 20,824 private federal question cases). Similarly,
in the district courts, private federal question cases grew from 10.3% of case filings in
1960 to 57.5% in 1994. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. C2, at 232
(reporting 9207 private federal question cases) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
73, tbl. 4, at 7 (reporting 135,853 private federal question cases).
87. In the courts of appeals, diversity cases made up 19% of the filings in 1960,
but dwindled to 8.1% of appellate filings in 1994. Compare 1960 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 73, tbl. B5, at 223 (reporting 740 diversity cases) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 73, tbl. B-7, at AI-40 (reporting 3898 diversity cases). Despite increases in
the amount in controversy requirement, however, see supra note 65, diversity cases have
held steady at about 19% of district court filings from 1960 through 1994. Compare 1960
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. C2, at 230 (reporting 17,048 diversity cases, or
19.13%) with 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. C-4, at Al-S0 (reporting 53,632
diversity cases, or 19.02%).
88. In the courts of appeals, 84% of the cases commenced in 1960 were civil,
while 16% were criminal cases. 1960 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. B1, at 210
(reporting 623 criminal and 3276 civil cases commenced). Figures for prisoner petitions
at the appellate level are unavailable in the 1960 report. In 1994, 77.9% of the cases
commenced in the courts of appeals were civil, and 22.1% were criminal. 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, at 4 (reporting 32,309 civil and 10,674 criminal cases
commenced). Prisoner petitions made up 27% of the docket. Id. (reporting 13,061 state
and federal prisoner petitions filed). Thus, in 1994, criminal cases plus prisoner petitions
occupied 49.1% of the appellate docket.
89. In contrast to the sharp increase in appeals, criminal and prisoner petition
filings have remained steady in the district courts. In 1960, 64.7% of cases commenced
in the district courts were civil, while 31.6% were criminal cases. 1960 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, thl. Cl, at 224 (reporting 59,284 civil cases filed), thl. D1, at
288 (reporting 29,828 criminal cases commenced). Prisoner petitions made up just over
two percent of the district court docket. Id. at 116 (reporting 1851 prisoner petitions filed
in 1960). Thus, criminal cases plus prisoner petitions combined made up 33.6% of the
district court docket in 1960. By contrast, in 1994, 83.9% of district court filings were
civil cases, and only 16.1% were criminal. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 2
(reporting 236,391 civil cases and 45,473 criminal cases commenced). Prisoner petitions,
however, accounted for 20.5% of the district court civil filings. Id. tbl. C-2A, at AI-58
(reporting 57,940 prisoner petitions). Thus, criminal cases plus prisoner petitions
accounted for 36.6% of the district court docket in 1994.
90. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 15-16 (stating that federal questions,
constitutional questions, and civil rights questions comprise "the principal role of the
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declining, jurisdictional reforms aimed at driving these cases out of the
district courts would have relatively little impact on the courts of appeals.
Thus, structural reform is essential to accommodate caseloads that will
continue to rise. But certain structural reforms, such as eliminating
appeals as of right, would be unpalatable in view of the high demand for
supervision of the criminal justice system.
Second, the rising rate of appeal, despite the contemporaneous
decline in the reversal rate, indicates that litigants and lawyers believe
appeals are justified in a growing number of cases. To pursue an appeal,
the losing party must believe that error occurred at the district court level,
or that the law upon which district court rulings are based is uncertain."
To succeed over the long term, proposed reforms must aim to reduce the
volume of appeals by promoting certainty and predictability in the law
while preserving appeal as of right to correct error.
III. EFFECTS OF INTERNAL REFORMS
Burgeoning caseloads and internal reforms have combined to cause
two maladies at the appellate level: dilution of appellate justice in
individual cases, and incoherence in federal law. These ills are
compounded by the courts of appeals' dual appellate responsibilities.
When a single court is charged with both aspects of the appellate
function, it may become unduly preoccupied with one function to the
neglect of the other.' This problem plagues the courts of appeals today,
federal courts"); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business
Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles",
78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1798 (1992) (arguing that diversity jurisdiction should be
"jettisoned" before "attacking the federal judiciary's primary function "-federal question
jurisdiction); Jonathan D. Varat, Determining the Mission and Size of the Federal
Judiciary Via a Three-Branch Process: The Judges' Debate and a Reform Menu, 27
CONN. L. REV. 885, 909 (1995) (discussing improbability of reduction in federal criminal
jurisdiction).
91. Of course, many other factors, such as a decrease in the marginal cost of
appeal, could also explain this trend. See GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD POSNER, THE
WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 32-34 (1976). The increase in criminal and habeas
appeals, for example, is probably attributable in large part to developments such as the
provision of counsel on appeal, which removes any disincentive to appeal. See id. at 41;
Maurice Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate
System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 582 (1974). Moreover, the conviction rate in federal
criminal prosecutions has risen and sentences are now appealable, both trends which are
likely to increase the rate of appeal in criminal cases. Beale, supra note 66, at 986-87.
92. See CARRINGTON El" AL., supra note 18, at 3 (noting that the "traditional
duality in the functions of appellate adjudication" leads to "preoccup[ation]" with both
"general principles which govern the affairs" of non-parties and the "impact of decisions
on particular litigants"); McGowan, supra note 8, at 663-64 (stating that federal appeals
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where the competing demands cause both functions to receive insufficient
attention. Indeed, Judge Weis ascribes some current problems to "the
fact that [the courts] now treat all appeals in the same way." On one
hand, the natural tendency of error-correction courts is to focus their
attention on individual litigants rather than on the system as a whole.'
The courts' inundation with innumerable appeals alleging error below
deflects attention from the rarer appeals that present opportunities to
clarify the law. Thus, case-specific error correction predominates over
orderly development of law. On the other hand, law making may seem
a higher calling than error correction." The courts of appeals' screening
of "routine"" cases for summary treatment or non-publication of
opinions is an open admission that error correction merits less time and
attention than law making.' The net result is that both the quality of
appellate justice and coherence in the law suffer. This section examines
factors in the current structure, practices, and size of the courts of appeals
that contribute to these ailments.
A. Dilution of Appellate Justice in Individual Cases
The courts of appeals have adopted internal reforms that hinge on
changing the one variable appellate judges can control: the use of their
own time." Federal judges "have implemented rationing[, saving] their
time for the cases they believe require the most, [and] delegating...
work they view as routine to non-Article III adjuncts."' Judges
court with too many cases "experiences severe tensions" in trying to perform both error-
correction and law-making functions).
93. Joseph F. Weis, Restoring the Authority of the District Court, in THE
FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21sT CENTURY 97, 99 (Cynthia Harrison &
Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989).
94. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 417.
95. See id. at 420 (noting that Supreme Court has "approved and encouraged this
tendency"); id. at 428.
96. Robel, supra note 9, at 4.
97. See, e.g., Weis, supra note 8, at 455-57; see also Carrington, supra note 32,
at 424-25 (stating that focus of the appeals courts has shifted to law making as evidenced
by screening procedures designed to streamline the role of error correction).
98. Most notably, the courts of appeals have sharply reduced the time allotted for
oral argument and the number of cases in which oral argument is allowed, and they
publish fewer and fewer opinions. For example, in 1978, 33% of all courts of appeals
cases terminated on the merits were decided without oral argument. See FCSC, WORKINO
PAPERS, supra note 72, at 76. In 1994, the figure is 59.4%. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 73, tbl. S-1, at 28.
99. Robel, supra note 9, at 3-4. The cases that "require the most" are usually
considered to be those calling for enunciation or clarification of the law, rather than those
alleging error under settled law.
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themselves no longer perform all the traditional tasks of judging in many
cases." And even when they do, they do so more hurriedly than in the
past-and more quickly, perhaps, than justice requires.101  Judge Lay
pointedly states that "the courts of appeals today may provide in many
appeals only an appearance of justice rather than justice itself.""'z
Judges save time by eliminating oral arguments, processing each case
more quickly, limiting the time spent conferring with other members of
the panel, and writing fewer opinions. The fact that judges spend less
time studying cases"°E must affect their decisions. When judges have
insufficient time to study a case carefully, they may overlook errors.
Cases decided without oral argument are nearly always affirmed. °
The affirmance rate has risen in the years since internal reforms were
implemented." °  To the appellant, a rushed affirmance dilutes justice
100. Id.
101. According to Judge Lay, the federal courts of appeals "are so inundated by
the volume of appeals that appeals as of right can no longer be given the full deliberative
process to which they are entitled." Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1151. Likewise,
"the right to appeal has in practice begun to shrink to a mere formality . . . as appellate
judges severely restrict oral argument, deliberate alone, write skeletal opinions, write
unpublished opinions, affirm without opinion, and in some cases rule from the bench."
Dalton, supra note 59, at 63.
102. Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1155.
103. Robel, supra note 9, at 38.
104. Id. at 48 (reporting that in the Third Circuit, 61% of argued cases are
affirmed, compared with 91% of non-argued cases). Lesser disparities exist in the other
circuits. Id. It is difficult to sort out cause and effect. The high affirmance rate in cases
not argued may indicate that the courts of appeals effectively sort out the cases presenting
no difficult issues. But the high rate of affirmance may instead result from the courts'
failure adequately to explore the issues presented.
105. A subcommittee of the Federal Courts Study Committee opined that the
falling rate of reversal indicates that cases on appeal are becoming easier. FCSC,
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 37 (report of the Subcommittee on the Federal
Courts and Their Relation to the States). But it is equally probable that the falling
reversal rate means cases on appeal are not getting the attention they deserve. When time
is short, when information is lacking, and when non-judicial personnel have a hand in the
decision-making process, it is likely that more affirmances will result. See Carrington,
supra note 22, at 554. Ordinary principles of decision and deference have always
suggested that in a close case, the decision below should be affirmed. Thus, for example,
the effect of an equally divided decision is to affirm the court below. Certain standards
of review strongly favor affirmance unless, for example, the appellate court is persuaded
that the lower court abused its discretion. See, e.g., Texaco Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 875 (1st Cir. 1995) (describing abuse of
discretion standard as "deferential" and "not appellant-friendly"). The "harmless error"
doctrine calls for affirmance despite the presence of acknowledged error, if the error is
thought not to have dictated the outcome. See, e.g., Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks
& Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("harmless error inquiry 'involves an
assessment of the likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the case'"). But even
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by failing to convince him or her that the case received the court's full
attention. 10 When courts overlook errors, hasty affirmances deny
justice. Moreover, internal reforms do not affect all litigants equally,"°7
heightening the possibility of injustice in individual cases.
Appellate judges today rely increasingly on central and chambers
staff to screen cases for summary review, read the transcript and the
briefs, conduct legal research, draft opinions, and perform other tasks
formerly reserved for judges."5 In addition, they have delegated some
opinion-writing tasks to clerks and staff attorneys."°  To be sure,
judges supervise the work of their clerks. 1 ' But the act of decision-
making-the judges' responsibility-cannotbe separated from the steps of
studying the case, reflecting on it, and explaining and justifying the result.
To the extent that non-Article III personnel perform decisional tasks,
judicial involvement declines and judicial accountability suffers.'
Thus, the appellate process is diluted 12 from the model of careful and
deferential review requires significant time and attention. Determining whether the court
below abused its discretion, or whether error below was "harmless" may call for a more
searching inquiry than the abbreviated appellate process permits.
106. See Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1154 (characterizing denial of oral
argument as "short-sighted justice" and as denial of litigant's "right to the full deliberative
process of the courts"); Rubin, supra note 8, at 652 (describing "institutional judging").
107. Robel, supra note 9, at 49 (oral argument); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of
the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United
States Courts ofAppeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) (non-publication and non-citation
rules). Both articles argue that intramural reforms advantage repeat litigants such as the
government and big business and disadvantage individual litigants, and further note that
these reforms have been applied disproportionately to certain types of cases, such as social
security benefits disputes.
108. Through a survey administered to appellate judges, the Federal Courts Study
Committee found that "63% of respondents rely on their clerks to do at least some work
they believe they should do themselves, and 30% do so 'often' or 'usually'." FCSC,
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 72. Similarly, 39% of appellate judges reported that
they "sometimes," "often," or "usually" rely on staff attorneys to do work the judges
believe they should do themselves. Id. at 74; see also FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note
8, at 13-15 (stating that the increasing caseload at the appellate level threatens just
outcomes because of the resulting loss of collegiality); cf Carrington, supra note 32, at
423 (describing appellate process of early 20th century).
109. Robel, supra note 9, at 38.
110. But see Rubin, supra note 8, at 652 (noting that judges "cannot completely
review everything that . . . law clerks do or learn all that they know. Inevitably they
assist him not only in routine tasks but in the work of judging.").
111. Robel, supra note 9, at 51 (noting that giving reasons is the "sine qua non"
of accountability); see also FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 13-15.
112. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 8, at 653 (lamenting "dilution of judicial
responsibility as we have come to know it").
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wise judging that Article III sketches and society expects." 3  Several
federal appellate judges have commented that caseload pressures make it
impossible for them to devote sufficient time and attention to ensure a
thoughtful and principled decision in each case." 4  The courts of
appeals cannot short-circuit the deliberative decision-making process
without provoking a significant reduction in the quality of justice provided
to individual litigants. Reconceptualizing the appellate process is required
to ensure adequate consideration of each case despite rising caseloads.
B. Incoherent Law
Caseload pressures and productivity-oriented reforms breed
incoherence in federal law. Pressures of time strike at the heart of the
decision-making process.' The decisional process in the courts of
appeals has traditionally been one of reflection and discussion, but judges
report that they now have little time for either."' Without the benefit
of oral argument to sharpen the issues, and with insufficient time to study
the records and briefs or to research the law, important issues may be
missed or their nuances glossed over. And the sheer volume of cases
requiring decision makes it difficult for appellate judges to focus on the
need to develop a coherent body of law. Moreover, decision-making was
formerly concentrated in a court of three judges, all of whom participated
in each decision. It is now dispersed across numerous panels of much
larger courts and often includes law clerks and staff attorneys in some
tasks. Clarity in the law is bound to suffer as more people, some less
familiar with the law than others, have a hand in the process.
113. See, e.g., Bishop v. United States, 223 F.2d 582, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
(describing trial judge as "wise, careful and experienced"); In re Nathan N., 391
N.Y.S.2d 599,600 (App. Div. 1977) (commending opinion in which judge "carefully and
wisely exercised ... wide discretion and grave responsibilities"); Edwards, supra note
7, at 888 (discussing habits of "careful judges"); McCree, supra note 9, at 780 (noting
that judicial appointees are expected to possess "wisdom"); Rubin, supra note 8, at 656
(noting that "wise decisions" cannot be made by judicial assembly line).
114. Robel, supra note 9, at 38-40 (quoting judges' responses to a survey by the
Federal Courts Study Committee). The Ninth Circuit has adopted additional measures to
cope with its unusually large caseload and complement of judges. These measures include
among others the use of "mini-en banc" panels to resolve intracircuit conflicts or to decide
difficult or important issues. See infra note 127.
115. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 66, at 542 (noting the "disturbing" trend that
judges are spending less time on each case); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in
Modern Society, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 385, 403 (1983-84) (noting that "[tihe bigger the
dockets, the less time we spend on the difficult cases and the more mistakes we make.").
116. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 115, at 420.
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Internal reforms that limit opinion publication and the citation of
unpublished opinions cloud the concept of "law" in a system based on
precedent." 7  Failure to publish statements of decisions and the
underlying reasons is anathema to the concept of a law-making court, and
creates confusion about which decisions are, in fact, "law." The courts
of appeals' publication rules generally favor publication of "law-making"
opinions, but this definition has proved difficult to apply."'
Prohibitions on the citation of unpublished opinions compound the
problem by making it possible for courts to ignore prior rulings. These
practices undermine the system of precedent, create a "secret" body of
law, and fail to provide guidance for future cases.119 In short, they
jeopardize coherent law development. But at the same time, the vast
number of decisions rendered threatens coherence by creating innumerable
rulings which are impossible to assimilate."
Fragmentation inherent in the current structure further undermines
coherent law development. The concept of a "court" of appeals is a
"sheer illusion""' masking the reality that the "court" is merely a series
of panels functioning in a totally ad hoc manner.'2 Intracircuit
conflicts have become a "pernicious" problem in that they provide
insufficient guidance to district judges and make it difficult for lawyers to
advise their clients."z Mechanisms intended to allow the full court to
supervise its own law are breaking down."2 The use of the en banc
court'2 to resolve intracircuit conflicts or to decide issues of particular
117. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 10, passim. In 1994, 74.2% of courts of
appeals opinions were unpublished, ranging from 46.6% in the First Circuit to 86.6% in
the Fourth. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. S-3, at 30. Every circuit, except
the First, publishes fewer than 50% of its decisions. Id.; see also Robel, supra note 9,
at 49-50.
118. See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 10, at 788-91.
119. Id. at 785-800.
120. Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70.
121. Erwin N. Griswold, The Federal Courts Today and Tomorrow: A Summary
and Survey, 38 S.C. L. REV. 393, 404 (1987).
122. Id. at 404-05; see also Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 217 (predicting that
growth within circuits will exacerbate the "now-too-common 'law of the panel'").
123. Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541,
543-45 (1989).
124. Id. at 545.
125. The Supreme Court approved the en banc procedure in Textile Mills See.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) (explicitly imposing upon the courts of
appeals responsibility for maintaining stable law within each circuit). The Court's
approval of en bane proceedings was later codified and now appears at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1994). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that en banc hearings or
rehearings "ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court
is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding
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importance is increasingly rare and unproductive." At least in the
Ninth Circuit, en banc review itself now involves the participation of only
a minority of active judges currently sitting on that court.12 But even
full en banc review is, at best, a partial solution to the problem of
maintaining the law of the circuit."n En bancs are inherently ineffective
in enunciating the law." Further, en banc decisions are subject to
review by the Supreme Court." ° Moreover, they have no nationwide
relevance, and are no substitute for a Supreme Court ruling in guiding
future conduct of multi-circuit actors.'31 The decline in opinion
publication contributes to the intracircuit conflict problem by making it
difficult for subsequent panels to discover the potentially conflicting
decisions of prior panels. 32
Adding judges further threatens coherence by exacerbating
fragmentation. Each additional judge on a court represents a different
view on new or difficult issues. Because of the lack of time for reflection
and discussion to resolve subtle differences, this fact alone suggests that
cases will more often be distinguished (fragmenting the rule) than
involves a question of exceptional importance." FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
126. See CARRiNoTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 162 (concluding that the
increasing number of judges on a single court eventually causes ineffective en bane
proceedings); Hellman, supra note 123, at 546-47; Michael A. Stein, Uniformity in the
Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U.
Prr. L. REv. 805, 818 (1993) (reporting average of 7.5 en bane decisions annually per
circuit for the years 1982-91); Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 72 (describing en bane
proceedings within large circuits as "unpleasant, tiring and largely futile").
127. This procedure was authorized by statute in 1978 for courts having more than
fifteen active judges. Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994)). Ninth Circuit en bane panels now consist of eleven judges,
selected at random, plus the Chief Judge. Twenty eight judgeships (not including senior
judges) are authorized for that court. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994). For a description of the
Ninth Circuit's en bane process, see Heilman, supra note 123, at 547. The pre-split Fifth
Circuit declined to use the mini-en banc procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Michael,
645 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that en bane court consisted of 24 judges).
128. See, e.g., Meador, supra note 39, at 643.
129. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 427 (theorizing about how district
judges and lawyers apply en bane rulings in later cases); Arthur D. Hellman, Courting
Disaster, 39 STAN. L. REV. 297, 306 (1986) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRisis AND REFORM (1985)) (noting that en bane courts "can resolve
conflicts over which rule is to be chosen [but] cannot harmonize variant approaches to
applying the rule").
130. Carrington, supra note 32, at 425 (noting that en banes are, in effect, a fourth
tier of courts in the federal system).
131. See, e.g., id.
132. Dragich, supra note 10, at 785-86.
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harmonized into a coherent whole.133 As the number of judgeships
grows, the number of panel combinations possible within the circuit rises
exponentially." This fact, together with the pressures of time and the
increasing rarity of opinion publication, creates a system in which
intracircuit conflicts are sure to develop.135 The "prior panel" rules
adopted by the circuits are of little help in preventing intracircuit conflicts
if prior rulings are unavailable or if judges and their clerks have
insufficient time to locate and analyze them." The likelihood that any
of the current panel judges also participated in earlier, relevant decisions
becomes increasingly remote as the court expands."'
Intercircuit conflicts are an equally serious problem.13 Though we
live in an "increasingly federalized society, " " conflicts allow "the
same provision of the Constitution or the same federal statute [to be]
given differing authoritative meanings in different regions of the
country." 4" Though their existence is known, intercircuit conflicts
133. See Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 722 (noting that the more decisions rendered
by circuit panels, the less decisively they settle the national law because large numbers
of decisions produce variations that cannot be reconciled); Rubin, supra note 8, at 650;
Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1174-75; see also FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 13-
15.
134. Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 71-72 (concluding that the large number of panel
combinations, and resulting instability in the law, encourages appeals by litigants willing
to chance the appellate process in hopes of drawing a sympathetic panel).
135. See FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 93 (stating that intracircuit conflict
increases with an increased judiciary because more and more decisions are being produced
while at the same time more and more judges and staff are being added to handle the
increasing caseloads).
136. Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 72 (commenting that unless judges strictly monitor
the work of their colleagues, a task requiring increased amounts of the judges' scarce time
as each additional judge is added to the court, the panels can easily bypass the "prior
panel" rule).
137. See FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994) (noting that when First
Circuit had only three judges, "There was no precedent created in which all of [them] did
not participate.").
138. A recent Federal Judicial Center Study helps fill in empirical evidence on the
number and seriousness of intercircuit conflicts that was lacking in earlier discussions of
the problem. This study found a "considerably larger number" of unresolved conflicts
than earlier studies predicted. FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 58 (noting estimate
of 215 separate conflicts passed over for review in Supreme Court's 1989 term). For a
contrary view, see ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 34-35 (noting that the
"federal judicial system . . . reveals in its very structure that a degree of conflict is
desirable, at least in the short run").
139. ESTREI .R & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 128 (recognizing need for more
effective national lawmaking but accepting present system of "multilayered, regionally
diverse courts").
140. The traditional acceptance of a certain level of conflicts is based on a belief
in the value of "the percolation of law that is afforded by consideration of issues in
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often go unaddressed by the Supreme Court.1 41 Even the potential (let
alone the reality) for intercircuit conflicts in what should be uniform
national law (such as the interpretation of federal statutes) 42 hinders the
activities of multi-state actors." Both actual and potential conflicts
raise the specter of unfairness to litigants and citizens.'"
The current structure treats the circuits as autonomous units- within
the intermediate tier." Moreover, the courts of appeals have
developed doctrines such as the "law of the circuit"" that emphasize
multiple circuits." See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN., REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM=ITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING (1993) [hereinafter
LONG RANGE PLANNING], reprinted in Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 253. Baker has
described the percolation theory as "perverse," Thomas E. Baker, Imagining Alternative
Futures of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 GA. L. REv. 913, 962 (1994) [hereinafter
Baker, Imagining], and as "nonsense." Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and Ebert at the
Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1472, 1482 (1989) [hereinafter Baker, Siskel and
Ebert] (reviewing SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPRFME
COURT'S ROLE (1986)); see also Judith Resnik, Tiers (pt. 1), 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840,
858 (1984) (noting acceptance of an " impressive quantity" of legal discord associated with
circuit structure despite the fact that consistency is a "valued feature" of the legal system);
Weis, supra note 8, at 462 (calling percolation theory "pernicious" to litigants).
141. Justice White, in particular, frequently pointed out the existence of conflicts
when he dissented from the denial of certiorari. See, e.g., Brown Transp. Corp. Y.
Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1017-21 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); see also FREUND REPORT, supra note 6, at 580 (noting that conflicts are not
as likely to be resolved by the Supreme Court now as they were when its docket was
much smaller); Carrington, supra note 32, at 427 (noting that the federal courts fail "to
resolve authoritatively many questions of interpretation of federal statutes").
142. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity:
Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
123, 126-31 (1992) (describing costs of statutory ambiguity resulting, in part, from
conflicting interpretations of federal statutes).
143. FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 60; HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 6, at 207; Carrington, supra note 32, at 427.
144. See, e.g., CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 210-11 (noting "significant
problem of non-uniformity in the enforcement of national law").
145. See, e.g., Weis, supra note 8, at 459-64 (discussing circuit autonomy, law
of the circuit doctrine, and percolation theory); Baker, Imagining, supra note 140, at 927
(characterizing autonomy as "ersatz," increasing the potential for intercircuit conflicts).
146. Established doctrine deems the holding of another circuit merely persuasive.
See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a National Court, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1407 (1987). The autonomy of the circuits is thoroughly ingrained
in the minds of federal judges. To illustrate, consider the comments of courts aware that
they were creating intercircuit conflicts: Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121,
1127 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Because this opinion creates a conflict among the circuits, it was
circulated before release to all judges in active service .... None favored a hearing in
bane."); United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 943 (5th Cir. 1993) ("A copy
of this opinion was circulated to all active judges prior to the issuance hereof; and a
majority of the judges declined to seek en bane consideration of the issue as to which this
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their regional focus.147 The very concept of the "law of the circuit" is
anomalous under a Constitution that establishes federal-not
regional-courts.'" Professor Carrington put it bluntly: "for
institutions given to law-making, [the courts of appeals] are organized as
poorly as can be imagined." 149 But nothing in the governing legislation
or current case law requires the courts of appeals to adopt a broader
focus. Nor do circuits have the power to act outside their own
boundaries." 5  Arguably, the present structure of the federal court
system, by allowing conflicts to develop, is at odds with societal
opinion will create a conflict with another circuit."). The Judicial Conference of the
United States opposed a recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee that the
circuits be required to follow each others' prior decisions unless "plainly wrong."
REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 88 (1990);
see also Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 723 (noting that it is no surprise, given the
"ambiguous" position of courts of appeals judges, that "they follow their separate lights
and that univocal resolution of a common issue is not their highest priority"); Richard L.
Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93
YALE L.J. 677, 686 (noting that although "Congress may never have intended that the
concept of law of the circuit develop, . . . [it] was inevitable because the Evarts Act
directed each court of appeals to interpret federal law, independently"). According to
Marcus, "independent decisionmaking by each court of appeals ...is inherent in the
system created by the Evarts Act." Id. at 687.
147. See, e.g., CARRINGTON, ET AL., supra note 18, at 210 (noting that this
concept of "regional law" was introduced "not because territoriality is intrinsically
desirable, but because the Supreme Court could not be responsible for harmonizing all
decisions of all panels of a court of appeals").
148. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
149. Carrington, supra note 32, at 434.
150. No circuit has the power to address actual or potential intercircuit conflicts,
other than by weighing in on one side or the other. In reaching decisions, panels often
consider the potential for creation of an intereircuit conflict. See, e.g., In re Mayer, 51
F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1995) ("we do not create conflicts among the circuits without
strong cause"); United States v. Humphreys, 34 F.3d 551, 560 (7th Cir. 1994) ("we
should be hesitant to create intercircuit conflicts and to overrule decisions of this circuit");
United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) ("absent some good reason to
do so, we are disinclined to create a direct conflict with another circuit"). But see
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1994) ("while
we carefully consider the opinions of our sister circuits, we certainly do not defer to them.
...Our duty is to independently decide our own cases, which sometimes results in
disagreements with decisions of the other circuits.") (emphasis added); United States v.
Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993) ("we recognize that our decision. . . will
create an intercircuit conflict ... [but] we cannot adopt the Fifth Circuit's rationale
because we are bound by the law of this circuit ...in the absence of an intervening
Supreme Court decision or an Act of Congress"); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1400 (8th Cir. 1986) ("because we are not bound
by the precedents of other circuits, we are free to make a new assessment of [the] issue").
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expectations that expanding federal law be applied uniformly across the
country.
The Supreme Court, of course, considers the development of law
from a national perspective, but its inability to decide more than about
150 cases per term renders it incapable of effectively performing this
function.151 Of necessity or by preference, the courts of appeals have
assumed much of the law making role now unattended to by the Supreme
Court. 52 The current structure prevents the courts of appeals from
effectively performing this function by rendering them incapable of
"speak[ing] to any nation-wide problems with definitive or unifying
authority. ""' Thus, appellate capacity at the national level is
151. Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court is capable of hearing
and deciding more cases. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its
Caseload, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 402 (1960) (calling the claim that the Supreme Court
is overworked a "myth"); Erwin N. Griswold, Rationing Justice: The Supreme Court's
Caseload and What the Court Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 338 (1975) (citing
judges who believe the United States Supreme Court is not overworked). Others have
suggested that the Court could do a better job of selecting cases, so that, for example, it
could resolve all cases of intercircuit conflict. See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 137, at 308;
ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 116. I take no position on this question other
than to note that the Supreme Court's output has been relatively steady over the years,
although the marked decline in cases taken during the 1994-95 Term raises further doubts
about the likelihood of an expansion of the Supreme Court's docket. Cf. Nihan &
Rishikof, supra note 73, at 351 (noting that Supreme Court's caseload has fallen from
peak of 184 cases in 1983).
152. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 424 (noting that tendency of
intermediate courts to emulate Supreme Court's law-making role, together with caseload
growth, has led to Supreme Court's loss of "effectiveness of command" over federal court
system). The Supreme Court is no longer able to exercise reasonable supervision over
the development of federal law. In 1993, the Supreme Court reviewed 0.25% of federal
appeals court dispositions, and only 2.36% of cases in which petitions for certiorari were
filed. Dragich, supra note 10, at 767-68. Typically the Supreme Court hears as few as
55 cases per year in all areas of federal non-constitutional law. HRUSKA COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 6, at 212. One commentator notes that the Supreme Court "has
almost abandoned any attempt to supervise the application of commercial and business law
in the private sector," although these cases made up the bulk of the Supreme Court's early
jurisdiction. Paul M. Bator, Commentaries 1, 38 S.C. L. REv. 449, 450 (1987).
Moreover, access to the Supreme Court "is now very much in the hands of the ...
federal government." Id. at 450-51. Private litigants have virtually no chance for
Supreme Court review. Id. at 451. The infinitesimal sampling of cases considered by the
Court affords it insufficient opportunity to exercise meaningful supervision or control over
the development of federal law.
153. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 723 (noting that the federal court system
"theoretically speaks through one supreme voice but actually babbles with many heads and
even more mouths").
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insufficient." Appellate capacity cannot be increased at the Supreme
Court level. 55 The establishment of largely discretionary Supreme
Court review has been wholly inadequate to allow the Court to review
more than a minute fraction of the output of the courts of appeals.
Therefore, reform must occur in the intermediate tier.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERMEDIATE FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
IN THE THIRD CENTURY
Several characteristics define the courts of appeals today: (1) they are
the only courts between the district courts and the Supreme Court, (2)
they take appeals as of right, (3) they sit in three judge panels (except for
rare en banc proceedings), and (4) they are organized geographically into
circuits." They are, for the most part, generalist courts.' 57  These
characteristics are so ingrained that a radically different structure is almost
inconceivable. But the federal courts are faced with a crisis that will
require "fundamental change. " 5 This section posits requirements for
the federal intermediate appellate courts in their third century, against
which the reforms discussed in succeeding sections of this Article should
be evaluated. These requirements derive from three sources: the
functions of the federal courts, basic tenets of appellate justice, and
lessons from the past and present structure of the federal court system.
As in architecture, the federal courts' structure should follow from
their functions. According to the Federal Courts Study Committee, the
federal courts currently fulfill six major functions.'" The federal courts
enforce the United States Constitution; protect the interest of the federal
government as sovereign; serve as an umpire in interstate disputes; assure
uniform interpretation and application of federal law; develop the federal
common law; and hear appeals from other adjudicatory bodies, such as
154. The "need for.., a larger number of nationally binding adjudications" was
the "major factual premise" of the Hruska Commission. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at
718. But see ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 2, 133.
155. Estreicher and Sexton disagree. They propose 'changes in the case selection
process designed to minimize the over-granting phenomenon . . . ." ESTREICHER &
SEXTON, supra note 17, at 116.
156. BAKER, supra note 19, at 231; FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 113.
157. The Federal Circuit, of course, departs from a truly generalist model. But
some commentators point out that its subject matter jurisdiction is broad enough to retain
many aspects of a generalist court. See, e.g., Plager, supra note 8, at 860, 864; Daniel
J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 611-12 (1989).
158. FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 109.
159. FCSC, WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 72, at 108-25.
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administrative agencies." These functions require that the federal
courts be structured to promote the uniform interpretation of the United
States Constitution and federal statutes and regulations, and the orderly
development of federal common law. Thus, adequate national law-
making capacity must be built in, and the potential for conflicting rulings
must be minimized. The fact that "we are a continent ... [requiring] a
system of national courts workable over so vast and diversified a
country""' profoundly influences the structure of the federal courts.
It highlights the need to build in a national focus without entirely losing
sight of local concerns.
Basic tenets of appellate justice must also inform any proposed
modification of the federal court structure. These principles are
fundamental (and perhaps obvious); all proposed structural forms must be
measured against them. In the United States, rough consensus exists on
the following premises.
First, the legitimacy of the federal court system depends on the
personal responsibility and accountability of judges. 62 Internal reforms
have weakened this tradition. Proposed reforms must augment, not
further restrict, the personal involvement of judges throughout the
decisional process and must encourage judges to provide reasons for their
decisions." Adding judges to increase available judge-time, or
restricting caseload by eliminating appeals as of right, are two possible
ways to restore a higher level of participation by and accountability of
judges in appellate decision-making.
Second, the system must provide for a check on the enormous power
of individual federal judges, who are insulated from the political process
once appointed.' This means that every litigant deserves one real
160. Id. Two of these functions, protecting the federal government's interests as
sovereign and resolving interstate disputes, are primarily matters of federal-state
jurisdiction and hence, are outside the scope of this Article. Moreover, these two
functions account for a relatively small part of the overall caseload. Q. Beale, supra note
66, at 988-90 (discussing core constitutional functions of the federal courts).
161. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 217.
162. See, e.g., CoFFIN, supra note 137, at 231-32, 243-45 (discussing legitimacy
and accountability); id. at 302 (describing core values of individual integrity, pride in
demanding intellectual work, and climate of security and independence that form the
essence of appellate judging).
163. See CARRINOTON ET AL., supra note 18, at 10; Ruth B. Ginsburg, The
Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205, 221-23 (1985) (discouraging the
practice of abbreviated appellate opinions stating no reason for decision). On the
historical link between written opinions and development of the common law, see
Dragich, supra note 10, at 768-75, and sources cited therein.
164. This was a central premise of the Evarts Act. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
supra note 3, at 86-87 (describing power of district judges and noting practical lack of
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appeal. 1" Otherwise, the system fails to provide adequately for the
correction of errors. Elimination of the right to appeal would tell litigants
they are "dependent on the reactions of a single judge whose decisions
will be reviewed by a higher authority only as an act of grace.
Fairness requires that appeals be heard by panels to guard against
arbitrary, idiosyncratic decisions of individual judges. 67 Reformers
must respect these principles. Discretionary appeals and appeals to a
single judge, both of which would increase judge-time per case, run afoul
of the right to one real appeal.
Third, justice should be swift and certain."' Swift justice requires
that the appellate process not be unduly lengthened." Adding a fourth
tier would likely do just that. Moreover, any new structure should be
capable of absorbing projected caseloads and adapting to other changes
that confront the courts, without experiencing unacceptable delay.
Certainty demands that a final decision be reached at a fairly early stage,
not only after multiple appeals. The structure must encourage the
development of a stable, predictable body of law that is faithful to pre-
existing authority, but also flexible enough to respond to societal
changes.1 °  Thus, the new structure should facilitate the early
review of their decisions); id. at 109; FRIENDLY, supra note 66, at 43 (criticizing proposal
by Judge Hufstedler that would allow trial judges to participate on appellate panels
reviewing their decisions); Resnik, supra note 22, at 607 (discussing congressional debates
concerning creation of courts of appeals); Resnik, supra note 140, at 850 (describing
desirability and methods of circumscribing power of judiciary).
165. The right to appeal proceeds from statute, not from the Constitution.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). For 100 years, defendants in criminal
cases had no right to appellate review. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400
(1957); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 109. From 1891-1925, two
appeals of right were provided in several types of cases, but the 1925 Act clearly
established that one mandatory appeal was sufficient. Id. at 260-62. Nevertheless, the
"right" to appeal without obtaining leave of the court is "nearly universal" in the United
States, and has become "sacrosanct." Dalton, supra note 59, at 62. So thoroughly
ingrained is this "right" that few commentators even bother to justify it. Id. at 66.
166. Carrington, supra note 32, at 431 (noting further that "discretionary
accountability... looks] . . . very much like no accountability at all").
167. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that prior to
1891, single district judges often constituted the ultimate court of appeals); see also id.
at 87, 109. Moreover, multiple decision makers may yield better results. Resnik, supra
note 140, at 856.
168. See, e.g., The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1988). One of the
most common complaints by users of the federal courts is that it takes too long to resolve
a dispute. Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 213.
169. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 715-16.
170. See Dragich, supra note 10, at 775-80. But see Wallace, supra note 7, at
917-19 (pointing to the major judicial reformations, such as Evarts Act and Judges Act
of 1925, as evidence that Congress has historically placed uniformity of federal law
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resolution of conflicts, and, more importantly, should discourage the
development of conflicts in the future. It also must seek to enlarge the
capacity for providing final decisions of nationwide applicability.
The structural evolution of the federal courts provides additional
lessons to guide reformers. From the beginning, Congress has provided
for trials, correction of error, supervision of the court system, and the
enunciation of federal law.17 The 1789 Act, however, neither assigned
each of these functions to a single court, nor endowed each court with a
distinct mission. Instead, it split trial jurisdiction between the district and
circuit courts, and assigned the circuit courts both trial and appellate
jurisdiction." In addition, the 1789 Act assigned the Supreme Court
responsibility for both error correction and enunciation of the law. The
1891 Act, on the other hand, appears to have adopted the premise that
each court should have a distinct mission.1" Thus the district courts
were designed as trial courts, the courts of appeals as error-correction
courts, and the Supreme Court as the law-making court. As noted earlier,
the courts of appeals presently depart from this model by performing both
aspects of the appellate function. It is no coincidence that the appellate
crisis today, like the one of the last century, is lodged in the tier that
bears the burden of both error correction and law making. The idea that
each court should have a distinct mission is still sound,174 and should
guide reform efforts. But structural reforms must not impinge upon the
Supreme Court's ability to control its own docket, nor appear to create
another final, national law-making tribunal. Reformers must separate
error correction from law making, 5 and must also find a way to
distinguish the role of the intermediate tier vis-a-vis the Supreme Court
in law making.
Both the 1789 and 1891 Acts constituted some courts, at least in part,
of judges assigned to other courts. 76 The 1911 Act established the
second in importance to supremacy and should continue to do so).
171. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 11-12 (discussing 1789 Act);
id. at 99 (discussing 1891 Act).
172. For a recital of early, strenuous objections to this structure, see id. at 17-20.
173. Id. at 129.
174. ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 107 (1940) (noting that circuit
courts, which under 1789 Act had both original and appellate jurisdiction, came to be
thought of as intermediate appellate courts, and that 1891 Act essentially ratified this
development); id. at 195 (describing as "anomalous" the system of two courts of general
trial jurisdiction).
175. See Varat, supra note 90, at 905-06.
176. Both Acts constituted circuit courts of Supreme Court justices and district
judges. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 72; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §
3, 26 Stat. 826, 827; see FRANKFURTER & LANDIs, supra note 3, at 14 (noting that three
tiers of courts were operated by two sets of judges, and describing resulting problems);
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principle that each court should have its own judges.' " Personal
accountability and institutional loyalty are well served by this principle.
Collegiality is more likely to develop on a court of stable composition
than on one that draws judges from other courts. Judges who regularly
have to answer to each other for their decisions are likely to feel a
heightened sense of accountability, and judges assigned to a single court
probably develop a stronger identity with that court and its mission than
would judges who shift from one court to another. 78 Reform proposals
should retain the concept of assigning each court its own judges.
Traditionally, the federal court system has resembled a pyramid"7
with fewer and fewer cases moving up the hierarchy to courts of broader
geographic scope and greater finality."a  The pyramidal shape is
currently distorted by the burgeoning middle level and the extreme
narrowing of the final tier."' Assuming the pyramidal shape to be
sound, reform proposals should restore it.
Other structural features of the federal court system, while they have
persisted from the 1789 Act to the present, are not essential. The
regional organization of the federal courts is one example. Dividing the
federal courts into regions was prudent when prevailing modes of
transportation and communication made it impractical to operate the
federal courts on a nation-wide basis." Numerous realignments of
Carrington, supra note 32, at 426 (likening existence of en bancs as an additional tier
without a separate rank of judges to the situation under the 1789 Act).
177. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 1, § 1, 36 Stat. 1087, 1087 (providing for
appointment of district judges); id. ch. 6, § 118, 36 Stat. at 1131 (providing for circuit
judges); ch. 7, § 136, 36 Stat. at 1135 (providing for judges of the Court of Claims); id.
ch. 8, § 188, 36 Stat. at 1143 (providing for judges of the Court of Customs Appeals);
id. ch. 10, § 215, 36 Stat. at 1152 (providing for Supreme Court justices). The sole
exception concerns the short-lived Commerce Court, which was to draw judges "assigned
thereto by the Chief Justice of the United States, from amongst the circuit judges of the
United States, for the period of five years." Id., ch. 9, § 200, 36 Stat. at 1146.
178. JudgeWeis underscores the importance ofjudges' psychological identification
with the court on which they sit, noting that, under his proposal, "judges would think of
themselves as members of a court that issues opinions on uniform, national law." Weis,
supra note 8, at 466 (discussing unified court of appeals) (emphasis added).
179. See POsNER, supra note 13, at 13, 317.
180. ABA STANDINO Comm. ON FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A
CENTURY OF GROWTH 3 (1989) [hereinafter ABA, REEXAMINING STRUCTURE].
181. Q. POSNER, supra note 13, at 14 (noting difficulty of expanding intermediate
tier and apex).
182. Weis, supra note 8, at 464. The regional organization also reflected a young
country in which state and regional identity was as strong as, and often stronger than,
national identity. See Nihan & Rishikof, supra note 73, at 370 (noting that regional
structure balanced need for national uniformity and regional diversity).
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regional boundaries" over the years, however, indicate that the
regional structure is a matter of convenience and is not based on
fundamental principles.'" A second example is the constitution of the
federal courts as generalist rather than specialized tribunals. Although the
federal courts were originally (and for the most part, still are) generalist
courts, the creation of some specialized federal courts casts doubt on the
theory that all federal courts must remain general tribunals."
Moreover, the regional circuits have developed particular expertise in
specialized cases they are called upon more frequently than other circuits
to decide.1" Traditional features of the federal court system, such as
regionalism and generalism, should be reexamined in light of current
societal conditions and the functions the federal courts are presently
expected to fulfill.
183. See Nihan & Rishikof, supra note 73, at 371-74 (describing numerous
realignments since 1789); Thomas E. Baker, A Background Paper on the Circuit
Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals, in FCSC, WORKING PAPERS, supra
note 72, ch. II, § A.
184. The regional organization of the courts of appeals is unrelated to principles
of federalism, which concern the relationship between states and the federal government.
The organization of federal district courts so that no district (with the minor exception of
the District of Wyoming, see 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1994)) overlaps state boundaries reflects
the importance of local concerns. Judicial accountability is heightened when the judge is
a member of the same community, relatively speaking, as litigants. It is important, too,
that federal judges have the requisite expertise to apply state law. But even under the
current structure of the federal courts, these concerns are satisfied only at the district court
level. On appeal, litigants are not assured a panel including a judge from their home
state. For many litigants, the odds are overwhelmingly against drawing a home-state
judge. And even assuming judges from nearby states are more sympathetic to litigants'
arguments than judges from distant states, current regional circuit boundaries establish
courts designed poorly, if at all, to effectuate shared regional concerns. For example,
Arkansas and North Dakota are both in the Eighth Circuit, but appear to have little in
common. On the other hand, states such as Minnesota and Wisconsin, or Wyoming and
Montana, share common interests but are assigned to different circuits. Arguably, the
1789 design contemplated the need for national uniformity and addressed that need by
requiring Supreme Court justices to ride circuit. This feature was lost when circuit-riding
became overly burdensome, but was not necessarily rejected in principle. See Weis,
supra note 8, at 459 (discussing passage of Evarts Act despite flaw of failure to provide
for intercircuit consistency).
185. See, e.g., Plager, supra note 8, at 864.
186. For example, the Second and Third circuits are considered experts in
commercial law, the Fifth in admiralty law, and the Fifth and Ninth in immigration law.
Cf Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 728 n.171 (1984) (noting
that the perception of expertise of the Second Circuit in securities and Ninth Circuit in
Indian and federal land management cases may cause other circuits to defer to rulings of
those courts).
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Finally, reform proposals must be evaluated in relation to the
problems they are trying to solve.'" Not all reformers see the same
evils in the caseload crisis. Some, for example, focus on federal judges'
heavy workload, others on delays in the delivery of justice, still others on
the presence of inter- and intra-circuit conflicts as a source of injustice.
This Article focuses on two effects of the caseload crisis and internal
reforms: the dilution of appellate justice and the growing incoherence in
federal law. Thus, in my analysis reforms are judged beneficial if they:
(1) promote greater involvement of Article III judges in the appellate
process (or at least avoid further degradation of appellate
decisionmaking); or (2) facilitate the development of a coherent body of
federal law by encouraging well-considered decisions, promoting
publication of all law-making decisions, or lessening the potential for
conflicts to develop.
V. PROPOSED STRUCTURAL REFORMS, APPELLATE JUSTICE, AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW
This section reviews major proposals for structural reform in the
courts of appeals,18 measuring them against the requirements outlined
in the preceding section. Reform proposals fall into four broad
categories: (1) adding more judges to keep pace with caseload, while
adopting mechanisms similar to those now used in the Ninth Circuit to
cope with increased court size; (2) adding a fourth tier court between the
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to reduce intercircuit conflicts;
(3) implementing a system of discretionary appeals, at least for certain
types of cases; and (4) adjusting the present circuit structure. Although
innumerable variations exist within each category, prototypical models
show how each of these reforms might impact appellate justice and the
coherent development of federal law.
A. More Judges
Adding more judges within the existing structure has long been
Congress' response to caseload problems in the federal courts."
Currently, the Judicial Conference determines the need for additional
judgeships according to workload formulas and other factors, and submits
187. Edwards, supra note 7, at 873.
188. Because I assume that Congress will not significantly reform the jurisdiction
of the federal courts, I do not consider proposals to divert cases into other forums, such
as new Article I courts, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and the like.
189. FCSC, WoRKINo PAPERS, supra note 72, at 94; see also Reinhardt, supra
note 8, at 1; Rubin, supra note 8, at 656.
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its recommendations to Congress."9 Congress "is under no obligation
to adopt [these] recommendations," but usually does so eventually. 9'
This solution is inherently reactive because it is implemented only after
pressures have become acute. '"
Those who favor expanding the size of the federal judiciary believe
that "Congress will surely expand jurisdiction" and that as federal
caseloads grow, Congress will be "incapable of the carefully calibrated
adjustments to jurisdictional statutes that might otherwise restrain federal
filings."' Without additional judges, the courts would be forced to
adopt "massive changes," such as providing a "much greater role for staff
[or] severely truncat[ing] procedures."" 9 Instead, increasing the size
of the judiciary by double or more would represent a "comparatively
small" national investment that would "ensure fair hearings to all persons
entitled to the federal forum . . . . "' Under this view, adding judges
would counteract-and possibly reverse-the dilution of appellate justice.
Conversely, many have argued that a moratorium on additional
judges is required." In terms of the development of law, the remedy
of adding judges has been described as creating a "judicial Tower of
Babel."" 9  More and more judges-or more properly, more and more
panels-speak in disharmonious voices on federal law.' Adding
190. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF
FEDERAL JUDGES 8 (1993) [hereinafter, FJC, MORATORIUM]. Some circuits, most
notably the Eleventh, have declined to request the Conference's recommendation of
additional judgeships to which they would be entitled under the workload formulas.
191. Id. at 9.
192. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 19, at 201-02 (stating that this "ad hoc
solution" adds more problems to the courts of appeals and fails to provide any long-term
relief); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 270 (1981) (suggesting additional judgeships are only a "quick fix" for small
circuits, and only adds to problems of instability and coherence in larger circuits); Thomas
E. Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of Appeals, 37
FLA. L. REV. 225, 278 (1985) (noting gap between the need for and creation of
judgeships and further noting problems of assimilating large numbers of new judges added
at once); Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1161-63 (arguing that the formulaic method of
appointment of new judgeships ignores critical considerations such as new jurisdiction,
increased judicial workload and limited judicial resources, thus perpetuating a
congressional cycle of increasing judgeships and increasing federal jurisdiction).
193. FJC, MORATORIUM, supra note 190, at 25 (summarizing arguments against
a moratorium).
194. Id. at 44.
195. Id. at 25-26.
196. Id. at 26-54 (evaluating arguments for and against a moratorium).
197. Meador, supra note 39, at 642; see also Jon D. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The
Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187 (1993).
198. Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 11; Posner, supra note 8, at 762-65 (commenting
that on a court of more than nine judges, deliberation resembles that of a legislature more
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judges within the existing circuit structure exacerbates the problem of
intracircuit conflicts, as large circuits find it increasingly difficult to
ensure control by the majority over the law of the circuit.'
Adaptations such as increasing reliance on chambers staff, reduction in
time available for review and discussion of draft opinions, and non-
publication of opinions have removed the safeguards that were intended
to allow a "court" to sit in rotating panels while still providing for
coherent development of the body of law under the watchful eyes of all
its members. Furthermore, divergent panel rulings within a circuit
represent additional points of potential conflict with rulings in other
circuits.
Quite apart from its impact on the development of law, adding judges
is no remedy for the current problems of the courts of appeals. °
Congress simply cannot add new judgeships fast enough to keep pace with
the rising tide of appeals. 1  Even after the massive influx of new
judges authorized in the 1990 Biden Bill,' the lower federal courts are
than a judicial body, and arguing that addition of more appellate judges would "seriously
degrad[e] the quality of federal appellate justice"); see also Tjoflat, supra note 120, at 71-
73 (stating the addition of each new judge further threatens coherence and uniformity,
increases litigiousness, and decreases the court's ability to protect litigants rights).
199. See ABA, REEXAMINING STRUCTURE, supra note 180, at 7-8 (concluding that
increasing the size of the judiciary increases the cost of resolving intracircuit conflicts
because more judges must sit en banc, unless measures similar to the Ninth Circuit's mini-
en banc approach are adopted); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. COMM. ON LONG
RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 17 (Comm.
Print 1994) (noting the prohibitive cost of additional facilities and concluding that
unrestrained increase in the number of judgeships is not economically or practically
feasible).
200. See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 137, at 217 (noting that need for judges will
continue to rise and that capping the size of the judiciary would result in the exclusion of
many litigants from the judicial process); Baker, supra note 192, at 276 (noting that
impact on appeals per panel ratio lasts only one year after addition of judges). As long
ago as 1954, Justice Frankfurter warned that adding judges would not alleviate caseload
pressures but would threaten the quality of the federal judiciary. Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
201. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-8 (acknowledging that expanding
judicial and support staff at any level within the federal courts cannot meet the unlimited
increases in caseloads in the long run, in part because of the three-tier structure); BAKER,
supra note 19, at 199 (suggesting "the crisis of volume has exceeded existing judge-
staffing mechanisms").
202. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 202-203,
104 Stat. 5089, 5098-5101 (adding 11 court of appeals judges, 61 district judges, and 13
temporary judgeships). The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, "emphatically
reject[ed]" the view that adding judges was sufficient to correct problems of cost and
delay in the federal courts. S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
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as overworked as ever. 3 The circuits are approaching a size at which
they cannot function as designed.' Some argue that expanding the size
of the federal judiciary may have the effect of reducing the quality of
judges.' In short, maintaining a relatively small appellate judiciary is
necessary "to protect [the judiciary's] effective working relations, prevent
undue inter- and intra-court conflicts, avoid an unacceptable number of
mediocre appointments, and provide the public with an effective and
respected forum."' Moreover, proponents of a moratorium argue that
it would "force Congress to control jurisdictional expansion and restrict
unnecessary access to the courts.'
Many of the arguments against adding judges hinge on the specific
characteristics of the courts of appeals as presently structured." If the
current regional structure were abandoned, or if subject matter
specialization were adopted, arguments against expanding the judiciary
would lose some of their force. Either of these structural modifications
203. Wilkinson points out that, after packing the lower federal courts to reach a
total of 828 federal judges in 1990, Congress feels encouraged to confer further federal
jurisdiction on the courts, thus continuing the cycle of increased workloads and increased
judgeships. Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1163-64.
204. The conventional view is that a circuit should have no more than nine active
judges. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1964). At present, every
circuit except the First exceeds this number. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994). The Ninth
Circuit is presently authorized 28 judgeships. id. Although the courts of appeals grew
beyond nine judges with little apparent difficulty, the prospect of circuits of forty, fifty,
or more judges is anathema to most commentators. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7, at
918 (arguing that increasing the federal judiciary at the appellate level threatens the
circuits' manageability as well as judicial collegiality). But see Reinhardt, supra note 21,
at 52.
205. See, e.g., FCSC, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 72, at 95-97; Newman, supra
note 8, at 763-66 (arguing that an increase in federal judgeships decreases the quality of
the selection process, as well as the quality of performance); Wilkinson, supra note 8, at
1167-78 (concluding that increasing the number of federal judgeships decreases collegiality
at the appellate level, destabilizes the law of the circuit, and lowers the quality and status
of the position).
206. FJC, MORATORIUM, supra note 190, at 23 (summarizing arguments in favor
of a moratorium).
207. Id. at 24; cf Posner, supra note 8, at 761 (arguing further that a moratorium
on the number of district court judgeships is the simplest and cheapest way to stem the
rising flow of the appellate caseload).
208. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-8 (noting that "the reason that the
federal courts cannot accommodate unlimited increases in the demand for their services
by expanding their personnel lies both in the character of the federal judiciary and the
limitations of the pyramidal three-tier system within which federal courts now operate");
cf POSNER, supra note 13, at 148 (commenting that perceived disadvantages of reform
proposals such as those calling for specialized courts assume maintenance of the existing
court structure).
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would lessen potential conflicts.' But under the present structure,
adding judges in sufficient numbers to keep pace with burgeoning
caseloads would be counterproductive to maintaining coherence in federal
law.
B. Fourth Tier
Numerous studies have recommended the creation of a fourth tier
appellate court located above the courts of appeals. 210 Reformers have
postulated a variety of relationships between the Supreme Court and the
new court. The Freund Group21' in 1972 proposed a National Court of
Appeals, to be charged with screening all cases seeking Supreme Court
review. 212 This new court would pass several hundred cases on to the
Supreme Court each year.213 The new court's denial of further review
would be final.214 The proposed new court would decide on the merits
cases of intercircuit conflict involving issues that did not warrant Supreme
Court review. 215  The Freund Group proposed that the National Court
of Appeals be composed of seven active circuit judges serving limited,
staggered terms, 26 and sit as a unitary court, not in panels. The
objective of this plan was to conserve the Supreme Court's time for law
making by relieving it of the burden of screening petitions of review.217
It also sought to secure prompt and final resolution of intercircuit
conflicts.
209. Posner, supra note 8, at 790.
210. Major proposals in this category include the report of the Freund Committee,
Chief Justice Burger's inter-circuit tribunal proposal, and other proposals for a national
court of appeals. The possibility of a fourth tier was mentioned as early as 1928.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 300 (noting that a fourth tier would be an
improbable solution for relieving predicted future expansion of the Supreme Court's
caseload); see also BAKER, supra note 19, at 238-79; Campbell, supra note 8, at 297;
Hufstedler, supra note 8, at 798.
211. The Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court was appointed in
1971 by Chief Justice Burger. As its name suggests, this group was charged with
addressing problems of the Supreme Court, not the lower federal courts. The Study
Group was chaired by Professor Paul A. Freund of the Harvard Law School.
212. All petitions for review now filed with the Supreme Court would be filed with
the new court. FREUND REPORT, supra note 6, at 590.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 592.
215. In such cases, the decision of the new court would be final and not reviewable
in the Supreme Court. Id. at 592-93.
216. Id. at 591. Thus, this proposal ran afoul of the notion that each court should
have its own judges.
217. See id. at 594-95; ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 26.
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In 1975, the Hruska Commission"' also called for the
establishment of a National Court of Appeals,219 but it resembled the
Freund proposal in name only. The Hruska Commission's National Court
of Appeals would take cases either by referral from the Supreme Court
or by transfer from a circuit panel. Transfer would be appropriate in
cases turning on a rule of federal law "applicable to a recurring factual
situation" and requiring prompt determination,') or in cases presenting
an intercircuit conflict.' The new court would have discretion to
reject cases received on transfer or referred by the Supreme Court.'
The new court would have seven judges sitting as a single bench.'
They would be appointed and serve under the same conditions as all
Article III judges.' The objective of this proposal was not to conserve
the Supreme Court's time by relocating its screening function, but to
create additional capacity for rendering uniform, nationally-applicable
interpretations of federal law and for resolving conflicts beyond the
number the Supreme Court itself decides.225
Later proposals urged the creation of an intercircuit tribunal.2'
Former Chief Justice Burger proposed that the tribunal be set up on a
temporary, experimental basis.227 Others argued that it should be
permanent.2 The Supreme Court would refer cases to the tribunal.
The decisions of the tribunal would be binding on all federal courts. The
218. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System was
chaired by Senator Roman Hruska. As its name suggests, the mandate to the Hruska
Commission was broader than that of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court.
219. HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 199.
220. Id. at 199-200.
221. id. at 199.
222. Id. at 200.
223. id. at 199.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 208-14.
226. Legislation to create such a tribunal was introduced into Congress in 1983,
but was never passed. For a discussion of variations on the intercircuit tribunal idea, see
ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 20-24.
227. Warren E. Burger, The Tune is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, A.B.A. J.,
Apr. 1985, at 86, 88. For an analysis of Chief Justice Burger's proposal, see Rehnquist,
supra note 19, at 12-14 (advocating permanent implementation of Burger's proposed
national court of appeals functioning not as a fourth tier, but as a "lower chamber" of the
Supreme Court). See also Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the
Supreme Court: A Comment on Justice Rehnquist's Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 15,
15-18 (1986); Michael J. Broyde, Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts:
An Analysis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term,
62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 610 (1987).
228. See, e.g., Hufstedler, supra note 8, at 798.
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court would be composed of regular court of appeals judges who would
sit for limited periods of time and who would retain their original circuit
assignments.2  The objective of the intercircuit tribunal would be to
resolve conflicts quickly and authoritatively.
Fourth tier proposals have been met with extreme hostility. They
often appear to create a second "supreme court" in violation of Article III
of the Constitution. Opposition to the Freund Plan centered on its
relocation of the Supreme Court's screening function to the proposed
National Court of Appeals. According to one commentator a "powerful
refrain" emerged: access to the Supreme Court must remain open to all
litigants, and the Supreme Court must retain "total, absolute control of its
docket." Subsequent proposals addressed these criticisms. They
provided instead for cases to be referred by the Supreme Court to the new
body. 31 Cases decided by the new court would be eligible for Supreme
Court review on certiorari 32 Opponents of the Hruska Plan charged
that the plan would not work. Either the Supreme Court would closely
supervise the decisions of the National Court of Appeals, eliminating any
reduction in the Court's workload, or it would cede some of its authority
to the new court3 3 Finally, fourth-tier proposals would elongate the
appellate process by adding, in most instances, an additional layer, and
would thus exacerbate the problem of delay in the federal courts.'
Fourth-tier proposals offer no relief to the courts of appeals, where
help is needed most. Rather, proposals to add a fourth tier recognize that
the Supreme Court cannot keep up with its (theoretically) exclusive
responsibility for law making. 35 A fourth-tier court like the Hruska
229. Thus, like the Freund Group's National Court of Appeals, it would be a court
without its own judges.
230. Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 714-15; see also ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra
note 17, at 26-27; cf Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the
Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 266-67 (1980) (calling creation of a national
court a "carcinogen" in part because it is based on the false assumption that the Supreme
Court's role as final arbiter is delegable).
231. See, e.g., HRUSKA COMM'N REPORT, supra note 6, at 199.
232. Id. at 200.
233. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 29.
234. See id. at 29-30; Lay, The Federal Appeals Process, supra note 8, at 524
(stating that fourth-tier proposals fail to address the need for expeditious results, thus
decreasing the public's image of the judicial system); Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 724-
29; Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 1184-85 (arguing that fourth tier would prolong litigation
without helping the system decide any additional cases).
235. See Wallace, supra note 7, at 914 (acknowledging that the Hruska
Commission's proposal was aimed at relieving the perceived "crushing burden"
experienced by the Supreme Court). Professor Hellman, for one, disputes the theory that
the Supreme Court is overworked and cannot resolve actual and potential conflicts in a
timely manner. Arthur D. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal.: Do We Need It?
1996:11
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Commission's National Court of Appeals or the intercircuit tribunal
attempts to remedy the Supreme Court's inability to resolve intercircuit
conflicts and establish uniform rules on recurring issues.' But such
a fourth-tier court cannot relieve the congestion in the courts of appeals.
Nor can it help the courts of appeals counteract the dilution of appellate
justice that has resulted from those courts' self-help remedies. Finally,
with limited transfer and reference jurisdiction, fourth-tier courts cannot
facilitate the coherent, consistent enunciation and application of federal
law, for which the courts of appeals would remain the last resort in most
cases.
C. Discretionary Appeals
One obvious way to ease the courts of appeals' caseload would be to
implement discretionary appeals, a strategy some commentators view as
inevitable.' 7 Early proposals for discretionary review in the courts of
appeals focused on specific types of cases, such as administrative
proceedings, in which multiple appeals as of right are now provided. 8
The premise of such proposals is that one appeal as of right is sufficient
to correct errors. 9 Subsequent proposals went further, suggesting that
the courts of appeals be granted "discretionary leave to refuse to review,
at least in civil cases, any appeal that on its face does not appear to be
substantial or meritorious."' On the other hand, Judge Lay's proposal
explicitly preserved "a right of full review, including oral argument, in
[all] direct criminal appeals." 2" Professor Dalton proposed a "partial
certiorari" 2 system in which appeal as of right should be preserved
where it is "extrinsically justified" because it "produces gains . . . that
more than offset the costs of uncorrected error."' 3 Such cases would
Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 375, 380-92 (1984).
236. Estreicher and Sexton state that fourth-tier proposals fail to reflect modem
reality of the Supreme Court's role, "rarely attempt[ing to specify what the Court's
mandatory responsibilities are or to demonstrate that the court is not adequately handling
those responsibilities." ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 17, at 2; see also FCSC
REPORT, supra note 6, at 116-17.
237. See, e.g., Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 244-45.
238. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 66, at 177; McGowan, supra note 8, at 666-
70. These cases, however, make up a relatively small portion of the appellate courts'
caseload. See Newman, supra note 8, at 771-74.
239. See Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1151.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Dalton, supra note 59, at 93.
243. Id. at 97.
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include criminal cases,' cases in which the government is a party,'
certain class actions,' and public law cases raising "issues of
considerable public moment."' 7 A system of discretionary appeals
would require the screening of petitions for review, and might save little
time beyond that already realized through the current screening
procedures which track many cases into summary proceedings.'
Proposals to abolish appeals as of right, at least in certain categories
of cases, represent a radical departure from one of the basic tenets of
appellate justice.2 " On the other hand, the widespread acceptance of
current screening measures by litigants, lawyers, and judges reflects
consensus that not all appeals deserve the same process.' Judge Lay
justifies discretionary appeals as a better use of the courts of appeals'
time, arguing that his recommendation "would actually provide more
thoughtful judicial input into meritorious appeals than presently
exists."" Professor Dalton shares Judge Lay's assessment that the
courts of appeals no longer provide more than a fragment of the full
process formerly thought to inhere in an appeal as of right. Moreover,
Dalton argues that appeal as of right serves neither to promote correct
244. Id. at 102.
245. Id. at 103.
246. Id. at 104-05 (discussing class actions where a class is certified and adequacy
of representation is at issue, or where the class is not certified).
247. Id. at 105. Dalton admits these cases will not be easy to isolate. Arguably,
Dalton's proposal would exacerbate the problem, noted by Professor Bator, of obtaining
Supreme Court review of business or commercial law cases. See Bator, supra note 152,
at 450-51.
248. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 430 (noting that "first-level appellate will
write about as much .. . whether the action sought is a reversal or a leave to appeal").
249. The Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to an appeal.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (holding that appeal is not a matter of
right, independent of constitutional or statutory provision therefor, and noting that
appellate review of criminal convictions "was not at common law and is not now a
necessary element of due process of law"). This holding has been reaffirmed. See, e.g.,
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). But see id. at 756 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the court might decide differently). Presently, appeal as of
right in the federal courts is conferred by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
Nevertheless, as I argued in part IV, appeal as of right has become a defining
characteristic of the federal court system. One of the premises underlying passage of the
Evarts Act in 1891 was rising public demand for an appeal as of right in criminal cases.
All states except Virginia and West Virginia also provide every litigant one appeal as of
right.
250. See, e.g., Lay, A Proposal, supra note 8, at 1157 (noting that 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (1994) already "places in forma pauperis cases on a different footing than paid
appeals," in that only the former can be denied as frivolous before briefing).
251. Id.
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results5 2 nor to encourage self-correction by trial judges sensitive to the
threat of reversal. 3
From the standpoint of law development, discretionary appeals make
sense. Law-making courts typically are given the power to choose
appropriate cases for enunciation, clarification, or extension of the law.
Courts exercising discretionary jurisdiction, as a result, reverse a much
higher percentage of cases than non-discretionary courts do. z' Their
output is much smaller, allowing, at least in theory, for less fragmentation
of the emerging law. Law-making courts typically are small courts that
sit as a single bench, reducing the probability of conflicting decisions
within the court or between it and other courts. The problem with
proposals for discretionary appeals is that they have generally assumed the
continuing existence of the present federal courts structure. In that case,
they would severely dilute appellate justice to the extent they eliminate the
sole appeal as of right. Furthermore, implementing discretionary review
in the courts of appeals would only add another dimension to the lack of
coherence in law development that structure already fosters."3
252. Dalton, supra note 59, at 73-86.
253. Id. at 86-93.
254. The Supreme Court, for example, typically reverses over half of the decisions
it reviews. According to the Harvard Law Review, the Supreme Court's reversal rate was
62.7% of cases reviewed on writ of certiorari during the 1990 Term, 62% for the 1991
Term, 52.8% for the 1992 Term, 42.6% for the 1993 Term, and 61.6% for the 1994
Term. The Supreme Court, 1990-1994: A Statistical Retrospective, 109 HARV. L. REV.
349, 349 (1995) (figures include cases appealed from the courts of appeals as well as from
state supreme courts and other sources). The courts of appeals, on the other hand,
reversed only 10.4% of all appeals terminated on the merits in 1994. 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, tbl. B-5, at A1-26.
255. That is, over time it might appear that the screening function is exercised
differently in various circuits, advantaging or disadvantaging particular classes of litigants
or claims and creating confusion about standards of "cert-worthiness."
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D. Adjustment of Circuit Structure
Many reform proposals recommend adjustments in the present circuit
structure.' These proposals typically focus on either the size and
number of circuits, 7 or on subject matter specialization."' The
Federal Courts Study Committee considered five variations,' endorsing
256. See, e.g., Lay, The Federal Appeals Process, supra note 8, at 525-27
(advocating dividing large circuits into regional divisions); Lumbard, supra note 8, at 44
(advocating circuit division or realignment rather than increasing any appeals court beyond
nine judges); Plager, supra note 8, at 863-66 (suggesting that all circuit courts be modeled
after the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a non-regional subject-matter
based appellate court, distinguishing it from a specialty court); Sporkin, supra note 8, at
754 (advocating, among many proposals, establishment of specialized courts); Wallace,
supra note 19, at 288 (arguing that large circuits, like the Ninth, increase precedential
stability and efficiency by providing a larger body of case law upon which lawyers and
litigants can draw). But see FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 114 (concluding that
reorganization of the present circuit structure would do little to reduce the appellate
caseload).
257. Interestingly, there are as many proposals to move to fewer but larger circuits
as there are proposals to move to more numerous, smaller circuits. See Parker & Hagin,
supra note 7, at 219 (describing proposals to create "an internally-chaotic, small set of
'mega-circuits' [or] an interactively-chaotic, large set of atomic 'mani-circuits'"). The
advantages of fewer, larger circuits are a reduction in intercircuit conflicts and possibly,
a more uniform federal law. The drawbacks, however, include increased intracircuit
conflicts. The advantages and disadvantages of more, smaller circuits are just the
opposite: decreased intracircuit conflict at the expense of increased intercircuit conflicts.
258. Either separately or in addition to recommendations to changethe numberand
size of the circuits, some proposals suggest the creation of additional subject specialty
courts alongside the generalist regional circuits. Specialty courts would offer a better
opportunity for persons well versed in the subject matter to maintain a coherent body of
law, and one that would apply nationwide. Specialty courts, however, run afoul of the
apparently strong preference in this country for generalist courts. Some suggest that
specialty courts are likely to become the captives of one side or the other in disputes that
regularly come before them, and that they are likely to lose perspective about the
relationship of the special subject matter to the overall body of federal law. They also
might present problems for litigants in trying to decide where to take an appeal since
many cases involve both "special" and "general" issues of law. A further refinement of
some proposals is to create subject matter divisions within the regional circuit structure.
For further discussion of specialty court proposals, see ABA STANDING COMM. ON FED.
JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMININO
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFrER A CENTURY OF GROWrH 10-13 (Comm. Print 1989)
(advocating non-regional specialized appellate courts for particular areas of the law with
nationwide significance, such as Internal Revenue Code and Federal Communications Act,
that are given only regional appellate review under the current circuit structure);
Griswold, supra note 121, 408-09 (advocating specialized appellate courts for tax cases
and certain commercial cases, among others); Plager, supra note 8, at 857-63.
259. FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 116-24; see also FCSC, WoRKING PAPERS,
supra note 72, ch. III, § B.
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none and calling for further study.' These five alternatives were (1)
to redraw circuit boundaries periodically to keep each at nine judges, with
a "Central Division" to allow the circuits to function as a unified
court; 1 (2) to create a fourth tier of about thirty ten-judge regional
divisions between the district courts and the courts of appeals and
consolidate the present circuits into four or five higher regional
tribunals; 2 (3) to create national subject-matter courts;' (4) to
merge all courts of appeals into a single, centrally-organized body;'
and (5) to consolidate the courts of appeals into five "jumbo"
circuits.' The Committee noted that in some respects these
alternatives overlap.' It also acknowledged that at least some of the
plans would require additional changes, such as an agreement that circuit
panels "adhere to the precedents established by panels of other courts,
unless the Supreme Court had spoken." 7
The number of variations on the theme of tinkering with the present
circuit structure makes it difficult to generalize about their impact. A few
elements, however, can be isolated. First, any plan requiring that courts
remain at nine judges (or any other arbitrary number) will require
constant redrawing of boundaries, assuming caseloads continue to grow.
Such plans fail to address the problem of rising caseloads, but instead,
merely shuffle the cases around. If the decisions of a court are binding
only within its borders, instability in the law would result each time the
boundary moves. Moreover, increasing the number of courts or divisions
guarantees additional conflicts, and hence, exacerbates incoherence and
the possibility of injustice to litigants. Second, creating a few "jumbo"
circuits ignores the strong opinion of many federal judges that circuits are
too large even now. The adaptations these courts would have to make,
such as increasing reliance on central and chambers staff and using mini-
en bancs, threaten coherent development of the law in the same way
internal reforms already have done. Third, creating additional subject-
matter courts or divisions, especially if narrowly defined, calls for
260. FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 117. One further study of possible structural
reforms is the FJC's report, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals. The FJC considered and evaluated total or partial consolidation of the circuits,
reducing the size of the circuits, and multi-tiered courts of appeals options. FJC,
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 105-22.
261. FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 118-19.
262. id. at 119-20.
263. Id. at 120-21.
264. Id. at 121.
265. Id. at 122-23.
266. Id. at 122.
267. Id. at 118 (discussing alternative (1)).
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segmenting the law more neatly than is possible.' Moreover, it seems
incongruous to design a system in which only the middle layer is subject
specialized. Finally, inserting a fourth tier would delay final rulings.
Delay is a hardship to litigants and prolongs the period when inconsistent
or provisional rulings are operative.
In sum, neither additional judges, a fourth tier, discretionary appeals,
nor adjustments in the circuit structure alone offer any real hope of
addressing the caseload crisis without risking further dilution of appellate
justice or greater incoherence in federal law.
VI. A COMPLEX STRUCTURE FOR THE THIRD CENTURY
Structural reform of the federal court system will succeed only if it
creates a flexible design capable of adapting to the "kaleidoscopic
changes" that characterize the courts' history.' In my view, flexibility
can be assured only by recognizing that the multi-dimensional nature of
the caseload problem calls for a multi-faceted solution.' Thus, I
propose a structure that draws on numerous prior proposals, weaving
disparate elements into a complex whole.
268. Recall the maxim that "the law is a seamless web." Cf. ESTREICHER &
SEXTON, supra note 17, at 127 (concluding that specialized appellate courts would not
effectively reduce the Supreme Court's caseload and are particularly vulnerable to the
influence of special interest groups); Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing
Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REv.
1231, 1233 (1994) (commenting that, although the "semispecialized" U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has improved "doctrinal clarity," it has not greatly
improved predictability); Posner, supra note 8, at 775-83 (cautioning that the advantages
of subject-matter specialization in the federal judicial structure are fewer than in other
areas of human activity where specialization is practiced); Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 442
(noting added difficulty of placing individual cases into only one area of the law).
269. Rosenberg, supra note 91, at 578.
270. The Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management has taken a multi-dimensional approach, calling for the establishment of ten
generalist circuits of 12 judges each, along with a two-track appellate process and
restructuring of the district courts. See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 140,
reprinted in Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 253-55. Others have called for multi-
faceted solutions, but have included jurisdictional reforms and additional internal reforms
as part of the package. See, e.g., Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 214.
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A. Major Elements of the Proposed Structure
This proposal calls for District Court Appellate Panels responsible
for review for error,"7 a unitary Court of Appeals responsible for
discretionary review and provisional national law making, and an
unchanged Supreme Court responsible for final declaration of federal law.
This structure rests on three premises. First, error correction and law
making should be separate. Second, national appellate capacity can be
increased by eliminating the geographic organization of the courts of
appeals and providing for discretionary review. Third, the Supreme
Court should be left alone. This section describes more fully the two
central elements of the proposal, the District Court Appellate Panels and
the unitary Court of Appeals.
1. DISTRICT COURT APPELLATE PANELS
The first premise of this proposal is to apply the Evarts Act strategy
of separating review for error from law declaration. As the 1891 Act
did, this proposal pushes the error-correction function lower in the
hierarchy. To do so, it creates District Court Appellate Panels2'
modeled generally on the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth
Circuit.' r An appeal as of right would lie to a panel of three district
271. Other than the creation of District Court Appellate Panels, the proposal calls
for no changes to the district courts.
272. The FJC laid out a sample model for district court review. FJC,
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 137-38. Parker & Hagin state that proposals to "add
another layer of federal appellate court structure-compromised of three district court
judges from within the circuit" have "garnered some. . . support," but cite neither the
proposals nor the commentary. Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 224. Although it did
not adopt this approach, the Court Administration and Case Management Committee
described the creation of an appellate division of the district court as a "workable
solution." Id. at 254. Other proposals advocating some type of district court review
include Carrington, supra note 32, at 433-34, and Shirley Hufstedler & Seth Hufstedler,
Improving the California Appellate Pyramid, 46 L.A. B. BULL. 275 (1971) (discussing
state courts).
273. Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs) were initially authorized by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 160, 92 Stat. 2549, 2659. The
current provision appears at 28 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). For history and commentary on
BAPs, see Thomas E. Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 545; Gordon Bermant & Nancy J. Sloan, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 181 (1989); Lloyd D. George, The Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels: An Unfinished Experiment, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 205,251 (concluding
that panels seem to be acting expeditiously and with desired degree of finality). After the
Supreme Court invalidated portions of the 1978 Act in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Congress passed the Bankruptcy
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judges from the same or nearby districts,.74 but not including the district
judge whose ruling was appealed. 7 5 District judges would become
eligible to sit on Appellate Panels after serving for five years.276
The District Court Appellate Panels would have jurisdiction over
most initial appeals. The Panels themselves would initially determine
whether jurisdiction should be retained or transferred. One way to
identify cases appropriate for Appellate Panel review would be to focus
on the applicable standard of review.' Standards of review already
"defin[e] the relationship and power shared among judicial bodies."'
Currently, matters such as admission of evidence, discovery, jury
instructions, and findings of fact are reviewed deferentially for the
presence of error.' Under the proposal, these cases would be heard
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
Under the 1984 Act, consent of both parties is required to trigger the jurisdiction of the
BAP. Id. By court rule, the Ninth Circuit has implemented an opt-out system whereby
either party can decline BAP jurisdiction and invoke district court review. 9TH CiR. R.
8001. The consent requirement flows from the fact that bankruptcy judges, who staff the
Panels, are Article I, not Article III judges. Since the availability of an appeal to an
Article III court is assumed, consent is required to waive it. This requirement is
irrelevant to District Court Appellate Panels, which would be made up of Article III
judges.
274. Of course, the increased workload engendered by the Appellate Panels would
necessitate a substantial influx of new district judges. See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra
note 140, reprinted in Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 254.
275. The Evarts Act prohibited the judge who had tried a case from hearing its
appeal. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827; see FJC, ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 8, at 136 (discussing inadvisability of allowing review of judge's own work).
The Ninth Circuit decided that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels would not include any
judge from the same district as the judge who originally decided the matter, and the
authorizing statute now so provides. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1994). Bankruptcy Panel
judges are to be drawn from within the circuit for which the Panel is established. 28
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994).
276. This requirement assures that judges have substantial experience on the
federal bench before hearing appeals.
277. See FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 135 (discussing cases reviewed for
abuse of discretion or insufficiency of the evidence). The courts of appeals essentially
apply a two-tiered standard of review now: de nova review (for questions of law) and a
more deferential standard, such as abuse of discretion (for review of factual
determinations and conduct of the trial). See, e.g., United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366,
372 (5th Cir. 1995). The proposal attempts to channel these two levels of review to two
separate courts, de novo reviews to the Court of Appeals and highly deferential reviews
to the District Court Appellate Panels.
278. 1 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 1.01, at 103 (2d ed. 1992).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile N.B., 59 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995) (plain
error review for admissibility of hearsay testimony); In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.
1995) (abuse of discretion review for discovery issue); United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d
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by the Appellate Panels.' ° Panels would be authorized to certify to the
next level cases raising debatable points of law or arguing for a change
in settled law, sparing litigants an additional layer of proceedings.
Review for error under highly deferential standards of review calls
for careful study of the record and established law, a task with which
district judges are highly familiar.8" One court of appeals judge
estimates that approximately one-half of the appeals heard "are 'easy': the
pertinent legal rules seem . . . unambiguous and their application to the
facts appears clear."' These "easy" cases are the ones in which initial
appeals should be decided by the District Court Appellate Panels. This
proposal's strategy for determining when the District Court Appellate
Panel should retain jurisdiction comports with the Panels' purpose of
correcting obvious or egregious errors below. By definition, errors of
this type occur only when the law is well settled and its application
reasonably straightforward, or where the weight of the evidence is clear.
On the other hand, "very hard" cases should go directly to the proposed
Court of Appeals; "hard" cases are the ones whose initial appellate
destination is least clear. 2 3
The District Court Appellate Panel proposal will work only if it is
the Panel's prerogative to determine whether to hear the case or certify
it to a higher tribunal. Counsel must not be permitted to evade the
appellate jurisdiction of the Panel simply by asserting a claim, meritorious
or otherwise, for a change in the law. Some appeals, of course, present
both assertions of error in the fact finding process and questions of law.
Under the proposed structure, courts would follow the established policy
discouraging piecemeal litigation.' The appeal would proceed as a
474 (4th Cir. 1995) (abuse of discretion review for jury instructions); Brunet v. City of
Columbus, 58 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 1995) (clear error review of findings of fact).
280. Consent of the parties is not required for Panel review. In the case of the
BAPs, consent is required because BAP review is by bankruptcy judges, not Article III
judges. Since District Court Appellate Panels would be composed entirely of Article III
judges, there is no waiver of Article III review, and no need for consent.
281. See FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 133. For a similar argument
urging that the Supreme Court not be required to pass on issues of fact, see FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 3, at 290-91.
282. Moreover, Judge Edwards opines that the opinions of other judges about
"which cases are 'easy' would probably be reassuringly consistent." Edwards, supra note
115, at 390-91.
283. Judge Edwards divides the non-easy cases into "very hard" cases (requiring
the exercise of discretion) and "hard" cases (presenting at least a colorable argument on
each side). Id.
284. See, e.g., 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4432 (1981) (noting that requirement of finality ofjudgment prior to appeal
"has been expanded far beyond its traditional elements in response to perceived needs of
effective appellate review").
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whole, not be parceled out to the Appellate Panel and Court of Appeals
simultaneously. Normally, the Appellate Panel would decide the whole
appeal, reaching questions of law only when necessary to the result.
When Panels decide questions of law in "mixed" appeals, discretionary
review would be available by the Court of Appeals. "Mixed" appeals
would be certified, in their entirety, to the Court of Appeals when, in the
Panel's judgment, that course seemed advisable.
A few types of cases deserve special treatment. The initial appellate
destination for certain cases would be determined by the type of case
regardless of the error alleged or the applicable standard of review. For
example, convictions and sentences in capital cases would be reviewed
initially by the Court of Appeals. The impact of error in these cases is
so great as to justify immediate review by a higher tribunal. In addition,
these cases will undoubtedly be appealed to the Court of Appeals anyway,
and the expenditure of resources for an additional, earlier review is
wasteful. For the same reasons, habeas actions in capital cases would
also go directly to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand,
administrative agency rulings would be reviewed initially by the District
Court Appellate Panels.' Given the deferential review of agency
decisions,' review by the Appellate Panel is appropriate.2
Precise procedures to be employed by the District Court Appellate
Panels are a matter for another day."' Whether oral argument is
285. Many such rulings are currently appealed to single district judges. Review
by an Appellate Panel would eliminate the somewhat anomalous review by an individual
judge. The rulings of a few agencies currently are appealed directly to the courts of
appeals. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 22, at 608 (describing elaborate adjudicatory
arrangement provided by Title VII).
286. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-21
(1966) (noting that agency action may be set aside only if arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence, and commenting on the highly
deferential nature of such standards of review).
287. But see Resnik, supra note 22, at 620-21 (arguing that redundancy built into
Title VII and similar schemes is essential to remedy possible deficiencies of first-tier
decision-makers).
288. An immediate question is what to do with cases already in the pipeline on the
date the proposal would take effect. Past experience is instructive: when the Eleventh
Circuit came into being, all cases submitted for decision before the effective date were to
be decided as if the Act creating the Eleventh Circuit had not been enacted. Pub. L. No.
96-452, § 9, 94 Stat. 1994, 1995 (1980). Matters not yet submitted for decision were
handled by the Eleventh Circuit or the new Fifth Circuit as if they had been filed there
after the Act took effect. Id. The former Fifth Circuit continued to exist for
administrative purposes for nearly three years after the Act took effect. Id. § 11, 94 Stat.
at 1996. Similar principles would govern the implementation of this proposal, as to both
District Court Appellate Panels and the unitary Court of Appeals. Since the proposal
preserves appeal as of right, litigants face only a different court (which may, of course,
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required to ensure a just result in an error-correction proceeding under a
highly deferential standard of review, for example, is an open question.
Courts of appeals judges have already dispensed with some elements of
traditional appellate procedure in cases considered easy or routine,'
and some of the internal reforms adopted in the courts of appeal may be
appropriate for Appellate Panel review.
The decisions of the District Court Appellate Panel would be
communicated in brief, unsigned memoranda intended to inform the
parties and the trial judge of the reason for the ruling. Giving reasons is
essential to maintain the quality of appellate justice. These decisions
would not be published in print or online, and would be neither
precedential nor citable.' Appellate Panel decisions would not make
law and should not be treated as if they did. Further appeal from the
ruling of a District Court Appellate Panel would be discretionary with the
Court of Appeals.
be significant), not the loss of an appeal.
289. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that judges have "endorsed..
procedural innovations" to speed up cases); id. at 54-55 (relating judges' belief that oral
arguments are held and opinions are written for publication in cases that need it, and
eliminated only in appropriate cases).
290. See FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 138. Questions may arise about
the potential for conflicting rules by the District Court Appellate Panels, especially since
the non-publication rule I proposed would make such conflicts difficult to discover. In
my view, the term "conflict" is a misnomer applied to the rulings of the new Appellate
Panels. The Panels' review would be extremely fact-specific. Since cases are like
snowflakes-no two exactly alike-different rulings would not generally pose a "conflict."
Likewise, when the Panels would review decisions for error in the application of well-
settled law, but would certify cases where the law is unsettled to the new Court of
Appeals, the potential for conflict would be low. The potential for conflicting decisions
of the Appellate Panels would also be reduced because all Panels would be charged with
applying the same body of law, and all opinions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court (the law to be applied) would be published. Moreover, we already tolerate some
conflict between district court rulings: there is no "law of the district," let alone a rule
or policy favoring adherence to the rulings of another district. Although district judges
often speak of "the law of this district," see, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp.
1434 (D. Kan. 1995), at least one circuit has flatly held that "there is no such thing as
'the law of the district.'" Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371
(3d Cir. 1991); see also Johnson v. Town of Trail Creek, 771 F. Supp. 271, 274 (N.D.
Ind. 1991) (noting that "opinions of other district judges are entitled to 'whatever weight
their intrinsic reasoning warrants'" (quoting Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119,
1124 (7th Cir. 1987))). Conflicting rulings would be settled by the Court of Appeals,
which should, in the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, accept such cases for review.
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2. UNITARY COURT OF APPEALS
The second premise of this proposal is to increase national appellate
capacity by eliminating the geographic organization of the courts of
appeals and providing for discretionary review. The proposal dissolves
the current circuits and creates a unitary United States Court of
Appeals. 1 Most cases would reach this court through a certiorari-like
process following decision on the merits by the Appellate Panel. Thus,
the new court's jurisdiction would be largely discretionary. Less
frequently, the Court of Appeals would take appeals by certification from
a District Court Appellate Panel,' or directly in capital and other
specially designated cases. In these two situations, jurisdiction would be
mandatory. The Court of Appeals would be responsible for final error
correction in cases that reach it directly and in discretionary cases in
which the petition for review makes compelling assertions of error that
persisted even after Appellate Panel review. In many such cases, the
error most likely results from uncertainty or lack of clarity in the law.
Thus, the review is directly tied to the Court of Appeals' primary role:
provisional declaration of federal law.
All current courts of appeals judges would initially serve on the new
Court of Appeals, with the number to be reduced by attrition as caseloads
warrant.' Future judges would be appointed and serve according to
the provisions of Article III. The new court would sit in panels of
five' assigned at random, often (but not necessarily) drawn from
291. Professor Rosenberg earlier proposed a unitary Court of Appeals for the
United States. Rosenberg, supra note 91, at 592. The Federal Courts Study Committee
and the FJC also studied similar options. See FJC, ALTERNATIVES, spra note 8, at 108-
10. The FJC noted that a "large majority of both district and appellate judges registered
strong or moderate opposition to a proposal linking discretionary review by appellate
courts with error-correction by a district court appellate division." Nevertheless, the FJC
found this approach "worthy of further consideration." Id. at 139. The most recent
proposal for a unitary appellate court appears in Weis, supra note 8, at 455 (using the
name "United States Court of Appeals").
292. The Court of Appeals' certification jurisdiction should be mandatory in order
to spare litigants the possibility of various courts passing the case back and forth.
293. For similar courts of appeals proposals discussing the role of attrition, see
Baker, Imagining, supra note 140, at 948.
294. The larger panel size helps ensure that a wider range of perspectives is
brought to bear in each case, thereby reducing the potential for intra-court conflicts. See
Carrington, supra note 32, at 434 (noting that present panels "are much too small").
Interestingly, 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994) currently provides that the Federal Circuit "may
determine by rule the number of judges, not less than three, who constitute a panel." See
FED. Cut. R. 47.2 (providing that panels shall consist of an odd number of judges not
fewer than three, and that certain appeals from the Court of International Trade ordinarily
will be heard by a panel of five judges). Assuming the current complement of 179 circuit
1996:11
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within the former circuit for convenience. 5 The doctrine of the "law
of the circuit" would be abolished' and panels would be required to
follow the rule of any prior panel of the Court of Appeals.' As a law-
judges, approximately 35 panels of five judges could sit at any one time, compared with
59 panels of three judges. Thus, the larger panel depends on a reduction in caseload.
295. It should be possible to devise a random, rotational system for assigning
judges to panels, taking into account geographical preferences and workload. One of the
advantages of a unitary court is the ability to assign judges where they are needed most.
Cf. Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 225 (discussing proposal to make district court
structure coterminous with circuit boundaries and noting resulting flexibility of assigning
district judges anywhere within the large district).
296. Some proposals call for abolition of the "law of the circuit" doctrine and
adoption of a rule that a circuit must follow the prior ruling of another circuit absent
intervening Supreme Court or congressional actions. Given judges' acknowledged
resistance to this course, doctrinal change must be accompanied by structural reform to
succeed.
297. One question to be worked out early on is what law (other than Supreme
Court decisions) would bind the new Court of Appeals on its first day (and until a sizable
body of its own precedent accrued). This Article assumes federal law to be, in some
degree, incoherent, containing numerous intercircuit and intracircuit conflicts. Thus,
rather than trying to select a body of precedent, I would have the unitary Court of Appeals
reach what it considered the best rule. In the short term, this approach could have a
destabilizing effect on federal law. This risk would be greatly reduced, however, when
one considers that judges act in good faith and strive to do the right thing.
Unquestionably, judges of the new court would examine decisions of the former circuits
(on which they all sat) and apply them conscientiously. The larger panel size I propose
would help somewhat by bringing more perspectives to bear on each decision of the new
Court of Appeals. But most importantly, it must be remembered that the Court of
Appeals would be a brand-new (and very different) court, whose role would be to make
national law, subject only to Supreme Court review. It would make no sense to create
such a court without entrusting to it the discretion to select the best rule among conflicting
decisions of the courts of appeals. Decisions regarding the application of former circuit
precedents were left to the two newest circuits. See South Corp. v. United States, 690
F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (stating that "the court sits in bane to consider what
case law, if any, may appropriately serve as established precedent" and holding that it
would consider prior rulings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals binding); Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (1 lth Cir. 1981) (en bane)
(considering "what case law will serve as the established precedent of the Eleventh Circuit
at the time it comes into existence" and holding that prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit
would be treated as binding precedent). In South Corp., the Federal Circuit expressed a
strong preference for maintaining continuity with prior decisions rather than "start[ing]
from scratch," 690 F.2d at 1370-71, but reserved to itself the "power ... to overrule an
earlier holding with appropriate explication of the factors compelling removal of that
holding as precedent." Id. at 1370, n.2. The Federal Circuit further noted that, as a new
.court of nationwide geographic jurisdiction," it would face many questions outside the
scope of rulings of its predecessor courts. Id. at 1371. In that event, the court found it
better to adopt the "careful, considered, cautious, and contemplative" approach of
selecting the best rule in each case than to make a "one-shot selection" of "one from
many available bodies of law" that may conflict. Although my proposal magnifies the
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making court, the Court of Appeals would be required in every case to
publish an opinion stating the reasons for its decision. Decisions of the
Court of Appeals would be reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme
Court.
A Screening Panel made up of experienced Court of Appeals judges
serving staggered three-year voluntary terms would select cases for Court
of Appeals review.' The screening function is critical: it is the
hallmark of a law-making court.' As such, screening is best
accomplished centrally, not by the regular, widely-dispersed panels.
Acceptance or rejection of cases for discretionary review strongly
influences the development of the law. Thus, screening should be
performed by judges, not staff attorneys or clerks. The additional burden
of the screening function would be offset by reduced service on
panels.' Decisions of the Screening Panel would be final.
The Federal Circuit would be retained as a special division of the
new Court of Appeals, exercising its current jurisdiction." The
specialty division would be bound to follow the rulings of panels of the
unitary court on issues outside its specifically-assigned jurisdiction.
Judges of this division would be drawn from the general pool of Court of
Appeals judges, but would be assigned to the special division for
scope of the decision about what law to apply follow, the question is not different in
character from the one addressed by the Federal Circuit. Finally, discretionary appeal to
the Supreme Court would be available from the Court of Appeals. Early on, the Supreme
Court should expect a number of certiorari petitions asserting that the Court of Appeals
chose the wrong rule from pre-existing, conflicting precedents. These cases would simply
be the successors of present intercircuit conflict cases.
298. Discussing unified appellate court models, Baker suggests that panels be
designed to ensure "substantial stability." Baker, Imagining, supra note 140, at 962.
Presumably, stability of the Screening Panel would be enhanced by relatively long terms
and by staggering terms so that some experienced members always remain. The Freund
Plan also called for staggered terms on the proposed National Court of Appeals. FREuND
REPORT, supra note 6, at 591.
299. Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Might Do to Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321, 1330 (1994). The
importance of screening cases for review was illustrated vividly by the furor over the
Freund Group's proposal to relocate the Supreme Court's screening function to the
National Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 713-15.
300. Screening judges could be provided one additional law clerk to assist with
this task. In view of the expected decline in caseload compared to the present courts 'of
appeals, and the larger panel size, other judges of the new Court of Appeals might find
two clerks sufficient.
301. Cf Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L.
REv. 1153 (194) (discussing possible addition of tax appeals to the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction).
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staggered terms of perhaps three years.' Initially, all current Federal
Circuit judges would be assigned to the special division.
For administrative purposes only, the present geographic circuits
would be consolidated into about six divisions of the new court." The
office of Chief Judge would be retained at the division level and would
continue to exercise the current administrative duties of that office.304
Panels of the new court would sit in the current circuit headquarters
locations or in other current places of holding court. Judges should
continue to be drawn from, and to hold court in, all parts of the country.
This provision emphasizes the importance of localism in judicial
accountability' and minimizes the need for litigants to travel farther to
have their appeals heard.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Structure
The proposed structure incorporates elements of earlier solutions
advocating additional judges, a fourth tier, discretionary appeals at the
intermediate level, and adjustments in the circuit structure, but avoids
some of their major disadvantages. Judges are added, but at the district
court level, where they can be absorbed without endangering the
302. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994) currently directs the Federal Circuit to develop a
procedure "for the rotation of judges from panel to panel to ensure that all of the judges
sit on a representative cross section of the cases heard." See FED. CmI. R. 47.2.
303. While the law-making function demands a unitary Court of Appeals,
administrative matters relating to personnel, space and facilities, and similar concerns are
best dealt with in the decentralized fashion that currently prevails. See FJC,
ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 110. This administrative structure roughly parallels that
of large administrative agencies, which have regional headquarters in major cities. See
U.S. GovERNMENT MANUAL 553-55 (1994-95) (describing the Environmental Protection
Agency); id. at 299-300 (describing the Department of Health and Human Services); id.
at 806 (map showing standard federal regions); see also Weis, supra note 8, at 476
(suggesting four regional administrative headquarters). To minimize disruption, I would
be content to leave much of the bureaucratic apparatus of the federal courts (dealing with
space and facilities, employment and similar matters) in place. See, e.g., Weis, supra
note 8, at 468 (discussing use of existing facilities). But this is a separate matter from the
necessity of a regional structure.
304. Chief Judges should continue to hold office under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1994). During the transitional phase, the most senior of the Chief Judges of the
combined former circuits could serve as Chief Judge of the new administrative divisions,
to be succeeded by the next most senior former Chief Judge, and so on, until the usual
rules again became appropriate.
305. As Frankfurter and Landis noted in 1928, proposals for "judges at large
without local responsibilities and attachments" have met with stiff opposition.
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 236.
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coherence of the law.' Authorized judgeships at the appellate level
would likely decline, providing for the concentration of law development
in the hands of a relative few. The proposed "fourth tier" is actually an
alternative second tier. It does not, in most cases, represent an additional
layer of review that would elongate the process. Some cases would reach
the Court of Appeals directly, bypassing the District Court Appellate
Panel. For most others, the Appellate Panel would be, in effect, the end
of the line. Discretion to reject insubstantial or non-meritorious appeals
from review by an intermediate law-making body would be implemented,
but not at the expense of an appeal as of right. The present circuit
structure is modified dramatically, collapsing all circuits into a unitary
Court of Appeals. Though radical, this reconceptualization of the
intermediate tier addresses the problem of conflicts and provides
flexibility to cope with rising caseloads and other changes over the long
term.
The remainder of this Part outlines the advantages of the proposed
structure in counteracting the dilution of appellate justice and promoting
the coherent development of federal law.
1. HIGH QUALITY APPELLATE JUSTICE
The proposed structure offers the potential for improving the quality
of appellate justice, reversing the dilution of justice described in Part
III.A. The dilution of appellate justice results from time pressures and
the imposition of time-saving procedures, and from the courts of appeals'
dual focus on error correction and law making. By separating these two
functions-as the Evarts Act did-the proposed structure allows more
focused attention to be devoted to each one. It also opens the way for the
development of distinct procedures at the two appellate stages.
First, and most importantly, the proposed structure preserves appeal
as of right. Review for error is an integral part of our appellate tradition;
proposals to eliminate it violate our definition of justice and are unlikely
to succeed.' Opposition to relocating appeal as of right to the district
courts may be expected, just as opposition arose when appeals of right
were moved from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals.' But
306. See, e.g., FJC, ALTERNATIVES, supra note 8, at 106 (noting that growth
affects courts of appeals differently from district courts). But see FRIENDLY, supra note
66, quoted in FCSC, WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 72, at 100 n.9.
307. See, e.g., Parker & Hagin, supra note 7, at 254 (rejecting pure discretionary
review on basis of courts of appeals' traditional concern with error correction).
308. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 258 (describing "deep professional
feeling against taking away from litigants the right to resort to the Supreme Court for
vindication of their federal claims").
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within a short time after their creation, the courts of appeals were "taken
for granted as courts of great authority."' In the Ninth Circuit, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has come to be highly regarded."' The
same should be true of the proposed Appellate Panels. The provision for
an Appellate Panel of three judges preserves the flavor of the current
appellate system and helps guard against the potentially arbitrary or
idiosyncratic ruling of a single judge.
Second, the proposed structure highlights the importance of error
correction. The screening function, which now operates covertly to
diminish the character of an appeal as of right, becomes an open step in
the process. Rather than selecting cases for abbreviated review, the
Appellate Panel would certify cases requiring consideration of a new rule,
a change in the law, or resolution of an apparent conflict. Thus,
screening by the Appellate Panel would ensure more complete review of
difficult cases, without denigrating the importance of review for error in
the majority of cases. Under the new structure, the mission of district
courts and district judges would be to provide a federal forum for
resolving disputes. Ensuring fairness through deferential review for error
can be seen as an integral part of that mission, not an entirely distinct
objective.3 ' Review for error would call upon Appellate Panel judges
309. Id.
310. Even though parties may opt out of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, over
two-thirds of direct bankruptcy appeals in the Ninth Circuit go to the Panels. Bermant
& Sloan, supra note 273, at 198 (reporting figures for 1986 and 1987). Panel decisions
are appealed to the Ninth Circuit less frequently than district court decisions reviewing
Bankruptcy Court actions. Id. at 205, 209. Attorneys who have appeared before the
BAPs prefer them to the district courts and believe they should be continued. Id. at 214-
16. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 provides for the establishment of
bankruptcy appellate panels in all circuits, subject to certain exceptions, indicating
satisfaction with the Ninth Circuit's BAP experience. Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), 108
Stat. 4106, 4109-10 (1994); see also Ned W. Waxman, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 313-14 (1994-95). The Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended that all circuits establish BAPs. FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 74-76.
311. The proposed structure arguably runs afoul of the requirement posited in part
IV that each court should have a distinct mission and its own corps of judges. The district
courts, with the creation of the Appellate Panels, would appear to have a dual mission.
Moreover, the Panels, made up of district judges, would not constitute a separate court
with its own judges. I would argue that the Appellate Panels would be an integral part
of the district court and share its mission. The Panels would be concerned, as are the
district courts themselves, with the integrity of the fact-finding process and the application
of settled law to the facts of individual cases. The Panels' responsibility for the initial
review of these processes for error would be an extension of the district courts' mission,
not a distinct mission. Experience with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panels has demonstrated
the viability of this structure. The proposed Appellate Panels' focus would be quite
different from that of the proposed Court of Appeals, which would be designed (as the
present courts of appeals are not) as a law-making court.
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to weigh evidence and apply established law, much as they would do
during regular district court proceedings. The combination of performing
fact-finding and reviewing the fact-finding process for error would bring
together two similar functions, compared to the two highly dissimilar
functions currently exercised by the courts of appeals.
Third, discretionary review in the proposed unitary Court of
Appeals, coupled with appeals as of right to the District Court Appellate
Panel, would afford some cases fuller appellate process than they receive
today. Well-established procedures in the courts of appeals currently
allow cases thought to be "routine" (usually those involving review, under
a highly deferential standard, of the fact-finding process or calling for the
application of settled law) to be "screened" for summary treatment.
Mandatory appeals screened for summary treatment frequently are denied
oral argument and decided without a published opinion, and not all cases
receiving such treatment seem easy. 12 Thus, entitlement to one appeal
does not carry with it the right to any particular process. Truncated
procedures may be appropriate for adoption by the District Court
Appellate Panels.313 But the objective of the proposal-to provide one
real appeal in every case-must not be lost. By contrast, all cases that
reach the Court of Appeals, either by petition or by certification, would
enjoy full, traditional appellate process. These cases would be afforded
full oral argument, would be decided by written, published opinion, and
would be precedential.
2. COHERENT LAW DEVELOPMENT
The proposed structure's separation of error correction from law
making also facilitates the coherent development of law because it is
easier to reconcile a smaller body of rulings than a larger one. Court of
Appeals decisions would be comparatively few. If Judge Edwards'
estimate that one-half of all appeals are "easy" holds true, the caseload
of the new Court of Appeals should be far lighter than that of the present
courts of appeals. A small number of cases would reach the Court of
Appeals directly; most would come under its discretionary jurisdiction.
Presumably, the proposed court would accept only cases calling for the
enunciation of a new rule, clarification of an existing rule, or resolution
312. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696, 2703 n.3 (1993)
(describing as "remarkable and unusual" the Fourth Circuit's affirmance, without
published opinion, of a judgment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional as applied).
313. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 433 (noting with approval that district
court appellate review, under Hufstedlers' proposal, see supra note 272, would be
accompanied by "renewed and rehabilitated rules of courts that assured oral argument,
conferences of the sitting panel, and written explication of the results").
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of a conflict. The comments of current courts of appeals judges suggest
that such cases are relatively rare.3"4
Besides reducing the sheer volume of appeals, the implementation of
discretionary review promotes coherent development of the law in other
ways. Full traditional appellate procedure would be afforded to each case
heard by the new Court of Appeals, providing the court ample
opportunity to study the case and its issues. In all cases accepted for
review, the Court of Appeals would publish a full opinion, making it
easier for citizens, litigants, and the courts themselves to ascertain the
current state of the law. By contrast, decisions of the District Court
Appellate Panel, which by definition would add little to the law (other
than undesirable bulk and confusion)," 5 would not be published.
Current doubts about which decisions constitute precedent would
disappear.
The proposed structure promotes coherent development of the law by
abandoning the outmoded regional circuit arrangement, while preserving
the generalist tradition of the federal courts. These two features lessen
the potential for conflict in and fragmentation of the law.316 Intercircuit
conflicts disappear with the demise of the circuits.317 More importantly,
the proposed structure eliminates the conceptually suspect "law of the
circuit" and restores the supremacy of federal law.31 This proposal
leaves undisturbed the important connection of the federal district courts
to the states within whose boundaries they exist. But the profound
influence of localism in the structure of the federal appellate courts has
persisted long after a national focus largely supplanted local concerns.319
Whatever need still exists for a local perspective at the appellate level
314. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 115, at 389-92.
315. This, at least, is the argument behind the current limited publication rules.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 120-27.
316. Scholars and judges have steadfastly argued that the regional arrangement
permits the beneficial "percolation" of an issue through several courts, leading eventually
to better or more harmonious decisions. See Weis, supra note 8, at 461 (describing and
criticizing percolation theory). Along with Judge Weis, Professor Carrington roundly
criticizes the theory's disregard for costs and delay borne by litigants. E.g., Carrington,
supra note 32, at 427-28 (noting that percolation requires "litigants . . . [to] pay its bill
and lawyers... [tol endure repetitious and dilatory proceedings").
317. Weis, supra note 8, at 463.
318. See id. (noting that it "would hardly shake the foundation of the Republic if
the courts of appeals began to think more in terms of the law of the Nation and less of the
law of the circuit"); id. at 466.
319. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 3, at 218, 219; Weis, supra note
8, at 463-64. But see Nihan & Rishikof, supra note 73, at 370 (arguing that regional
structure has "served the country well . . . [and] struck an appropriate balance between
national uniformity and regional diversity").
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would be satisfied by review in most cases by a relatively local Appellate
Panel.
The proposed structure retains subject specialization where consensus
seems to exist on its utility, such as bankruptcy,3' intellectual
property,32' and similar areas, but does not extend subject specialization
to other areas. By preserving the generalist tradition of the federal
courts, the new design promotes a broad, integrated view of the law and
avoids the fragmentation that may accompany increased specialization.
Finally, the proposed structure preserves the role of the Supreme
Court as the ultimate arbiter of federal law, an essential element in
maintaining coherence. The proposed structure makes no change to the
composition, jurisdiction, or procedures of the Supreme Court. It would
continue to control its own docket and hear approximately 150 cases each
year.3' These cases would most likely present, as do those reviewed
today, questions of constitutional interpretation or paramount national
importance. In contrast to earlier fourth-tier proposals, cases decided by
the proposed unitary Court of Appeals would not come from the Supreme
Court's docket, but would be cases now decided by the courts of appeals.
Although the decisions of the new Court of Appeals would have nation-
wide applicability, they would still be provisional determinations of
federal law. Review from decisions of the Court of Appeals would be
available by certiorari exactly as today. Access to the Supreme Court
would remain theoretically open to all litigants (though the likelihood of
review is still extremely low). The Supreme Court would retain its
exclusive responsibility for the final articulation of federal law, and it
alone would decide which cases merit its review.
Indeed, the proposed structure actually would restore some of the
Supreme Court's "diminish[ed] ab[ility] to control"3' the federal court
hierarchy. As a practical matter, it would increase the Supreme Court's
law-making capacity. Though many intercircuit conflicts currently go
unaddressed, the "largest segment" of the plenary docket is devoted to
such cases.' Presumably, the Court would decline to take most of
320. This is possible through the continuation and expansion of Bankruptcy
Appellate Panels.
321. This would be achieved by preserving the Federal Circuit as a specialized
division of the new Court of Appeals.
322. I assume that the reduced Supreme Court dockets of recent years are a
temporary aberration. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court-The Overview:
U.S. Justices Open Their New Session by Refising Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at
Al (noting that during 1993 Term, the Court decided only 84 cases, the lowest number
since 1953).
323. Carrington, supra note 32, at 432.
324. Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 947, 1015 (1985) (reporting that "conflicts were
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these cases were it not for the conflict. By lessening the need to devote
a substantial part of its docket to the resolution of intercircuit conflicts,
the proposal frees the Court to hear other cases it now must pass over.
Thus, the Court's opportunity to direct the development of federal law
would increase.
The proposed structure restores the supremacy of the Supreme Court
as the ultimate arbiter of national law. Constructs such as the "law of the
circuit" and en banc review lend an inescapable appearance of autonomy
and finality to the courts of appeals.' z Although the distinction is
subtle, the proposed unitary Court of Appeals would look more like a
subordinate court. It would lack a mechanism for controlling its "own"
law.' 2 Conflicts between Court of Appeals panels could be expected
to decline, owing to the smaller number and larger size of panels, the
manageable, discretionary caseload, and the requirement that all decisions
be published. The proposed structure does not call for en banc review of
conflicting rulings. Such conflicts should be few enough that the Supreme
Court could address them. The proposed structure reinforces the
Supreme Court's ultimate responsibility for overseeing federal law.
The Supreme Court's "effectiveness of command"327 is enhanced
under the proposed structure. Instead of thirteen courts, the Supreme
Court would oversee the decisions of only one court. All responsibility
for final error correction would be explicitly delegated to the Court of
Appeals. More importantly, the output of "law" from the lower courts
would be much reduced. The District Court Appellate Panels would not
create precedent, because they would not publish their decisions. The
provision for discretionary Court of Appeals review would encourage that
court to accept only those cases calling for development of a new rule or
clarification of an old one. Although all Court of Appeals decisions
would be published, the volume of cases heard would be such that far
fewer decisions would be published than are today under limited
publication rules. Thus, the body of law the Supreme Court oversees
would become more manageable. Although the Supreme Court itself
would remain far removed from the district courts, 3" it would preside
present in more than one-third of the 593 cases that received plenary consideration in the
first four Terms of the 1980's").
325. Carrington, supra note 32, at 425 (describing the courts of appeals as "junior
Supreme Courts, each having a territory in which it is 'semi-supreme' and for which it
is a giver of temporary law").
326. Cf. Weis, supra note 8, at 460 (remarking on courts of appeals' references
to "our" law-e.g., the law of the circuit-not to federal or national law).
327. Carrington, supra note 32, at 423.
328. See Carrington, supra note 32, at 432 (describing Supreme Court and courts
of appeals as becoming "less connected" to the realities of the trial courts).
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over a structure in which the importance of the error-correction function
regained its former prominence.
CONCLUSION
The proposed structure is consistent with the evolution of the federal
courts from 1789 to the present day.3 The only major revision to date
created a significantly more differentiated structure than the original
design. The 1891 design responded to a caseload crisis in the Supreme
Court by creating an additional appellate tier, pushing review for error
down to the new, lower tier, and providing for discretionary review in the
higher, law-making court. Internal reforms adopted in recent years
clearly recognize that not all appeals require the same process. But we
have continued to expect the courts of appeals to handle all initial appeals.
The result has been to dilute justice and lessen coherence in the law. The
proposed structure returns to the Evarts Act approach of separating the
two appellate functions.
Though controversial, the design proposed is less extreme than
jurisdictional reform, which would keep many cases out of the federal
courts altogether. Moreover, the proposed structural reforms are no more
radical than those implemented a century ago. Congress was slow in
coming to the rescue of a federal court system in crisis in the post-Civil
War period. The reforms it eventually adopted have stood the test of time
despite sweeping changes in the role of the federal courts. The present
structure of the federal courts is so thoroughly ingrained that change is
hard to contemplate. 3" But a major structural overhaul is imperative.
Congress has done well to move slowly, carefully studying the issues
surrounding the caseload crisis, its effects, and possible solutions. It must
recognize that adding judges, without more, is no longer a viable
solution.
The demands on the federal courts are numerous and complex. No
single treatment will ensure their well-being through the third century.
Instead, a complex structure, combining elements of several distinct
proposals but based on simple and enduring principles, must emerge. As
the federal courts approached their second century, vast changes in
American life created intolerable caseload pressures and called for an
overhaul of the federal court system. A century later, equally sweeping
changes demand another comprehensive restructuring. The time has come
for Congress to enact a new design.
329. Id. at 435 (noting that district court review mechanism might secure "at least
some of the values. . . [of] the Evarts Act").
330. Carrington, supra note 22, at 542.
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